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OPTIMAL TAX COMPLIANCE AND PENALTIES
WHEN THE LAW IS UNCERTAIN

Kyle D. Logue•
This article examines the optimal level of tax compliance and the
optimal penalty for noncompliance in circumstances in which the
substance of the tax law is uncertain - that is, when the precise
application of the Internal Revenue Code to a particular situation is not
clear. In such situations, a number of interesting questions arise. This
article will consider two of them. First, as a normative matter, how
certain should taxpayers be before they rely on a particular
interpretation of a substantively uncertain tax rule? If a particular
position is not clearly prohibited but neither is it clearly allowed, what is
the appropriate threshold of confidence that the taxpayer ought to have
before engaging in the transaction? Second, what penalty regime would
give the taxpayer the right incentive with respect to relying on
substantively uncertain tax law?
With these questions in mind, this article shows that, applying
standard assumptions from the economic literature on deterrence, the
tax penalty regime that would induce the optimal reliance (or non
reliance) on uncertain tax laws depending on the circumstances would
involve (1) a rule of strict liability with respect to taxes owed as well as
to the penalty and (2) a penalty that roughly approximates the famous
Bentham-Becker punitive fine, calculated by dividing the harm (the
underpaid tax) by the ex ante probability that the harm would be
detected. This article also explains why a fault-based approach to tax
penalties, under the standard assumptions of the classical deterrence
model, would not work as well as the strict liability approach. Reasons

•Wade H. McCree, Jr. Collegiate Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law
School. I would like to thank Alan Auerbach, Reuven Avi-Yonah, Omri Ben-Shahar,
Neil Buchanan, James Hines, Daniel Shaviro, and the participants at the NYU School
of Law Colloquium on Tax Policy and Public Finance, the Northwestern School of
Law Tax Policy Workshop, and the University of Michigan Public Finance Seminar
for helpful criticism and commentary on earlier drafts of this paper.
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for the inferiority of the fault-based approach include its comparatively
high administrative costs, its inability to properly regulate "activity
levels," and its relatively unattractive distributional consequences. This
article concludes, however, that if Bentham-Becker level penalties or
wide-spread use of tax liability insurance are not feasible, a second-best
case can be made for using a fault-based penalty regime similar to the
one currently in force. The framework used in this article may have
implications for any area of law where the substantive law is uncertain.
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I. INTRODUCTION

This article examines the optimal level of tax compliance and the
optimal penalty for noncompliance in circumstances in which the tax
law is substantively uncertain - that is, when the precise application

2007]

Optimal Tax Compliance

243

of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) to a particular situation is not
clear. These circumstances arise more often than one might think.
There are many clear-cut cases in tax. For example, when tax
protestors say that the U.S. tax laws do not require them to pay any
tax on their U.S. income, they are wrong; and if they take such a
position on their returns or, on the basis of this position, opt not to file
returns at all, they will, if caught, face a substantial fine or even spend
some time in jail. On the other hand, there are many close cases in tax.
Say you take a trip to Miami, during which you attend a job
related conference for one day and lounge on the beach sipping
margaritas for two. Is the trip "primarily for business purposes" or
not? Good question. 1 Or say you are a taxpayer engaging in a
transaction primarily for the purpose of reducing your income tax
liability and the transaction entails some, but very little, economic
substance. Will a court respect the form of the transaction and allow
the tax treatment you have chosen? Another good question.2 These
sorts of questions pervade the tax law, producing interesting issues for
tax lawyers as well as good test questions for the basic income tax
class in law school. This article addresses this sort of legal uncertainty.
A number of interesting questions arise in these ambiguous
situations. I will focus on two of them. First, as a normative matter,
what degree of substantive legal certainty should taxpayers insist on
before they rely on a particular interpretation of a tax rule? That is, if
a given transaction is not clearly prohibited, but neither is it clearly
allowed, what is the appropriate threshold of confidence that
taxpayers ought to have before engaging in the transaction? Take the
mixed business/personal Miami trip mentioned above. How sure
should you be about the deductibility of those expenses before taking
such a position on your return? Or how much economic substance
must a transaction have - how likely must a pre-tax profit be - to
justify actually going forward? If we can answer those questions, the

1 .See Treas. Reg.§ l.162-2(b)(l ) (as amended in 1995) ("If a taxpayer travels to
a destination and while at such destination engages in both business and personal
activities, traveling expenses to and from such destination are deductible only if the
trip is related primarily to the taxpayer's trade or business."); Treas. Reg. § l . 1622(b)(2) (as amended in 1995) ("Whether a trip is related primarily to the taxpayer's
trade or business or is primarily personal in nature depends on the facts and
circumstances in each case.").
2 See, e.g., Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960) (disallowing interest
deduction on indebtedness incurred to purchase thirty-year fixed annuity on ground
that the underlying transaction had no business purpose other than tax benefits and
that there was no reasonable probability of pre-tax profit).
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next question follows: what penalty regime would give taxpayers the
right incentive with respect to relying on substantively uncertain tax
law?
To address these and related questions, I will use the following
hypothetical: Joe Taxpayer (who can be thought of either as an
individual investor, a business owner, or a manager of a corporation)
is trying to decide whether to invest, or have his company invest, in a
particular business transaction. In making this decision, Joe takes into
account a range of issues, all of which boil down to one obvious
question: how much money will the transaction make net of costs? As
part of this analysis, Joe considers the legal consequences of the
investment, including the likelihood that the investment might lead to
some sort of civil litigation or government enforcement action. Joe
evaluates these legal risks then weighs them against the expected
benefits of the deal. Among the legal risks he contemplates are the
possible tax consequences of the transaction.
Now, focusing the analysis on the tax planning question, assume
that from Joe's perspective (or that of his company) the investment is
worth making only if it qualifies for a particular tax treatment. That is,
assume the deal makes sense - its overall expected benefits exceed
the overall expected costs - only if it qualifies as a "nontaxable
transaction" or, alternatively, only if it generates a special tax loss or
tax credit that can be used to offset taxes on other income. Thus, the
after-tax profitability of the deal turns on the answer to the tax
question. Now here is the problem: If Joe's expert tax advisor tells
him that the special tax treatment he seeks for the transaction is
neither clearly forbidden nor clearly legal under the existing tax laws,
how should Joe proceed? In other words, if the law in question, at
least as applied to Joe's particular transaction, is uncertain (in terms
of how it will be applied ex post by the Internal Revenue Service
(Service) or courts to particular transactions), what incentive does
society want Joe to have in this situation? What is the optimal degree
of tax compliance and what is the optimal tax penalty regime?
As it turns out, the answers to these questions depend. on a
number of factors. To see this point, let us simplify the analysis further
by assuming that the only thing Joe cares about with respect to tax
planning is the expected value of the sum of the possible back-taxes
(plus interest) and the potential penalty. Joe, in other words, is a
rational actor in the traditional economic sense of the term, a true
homo economicus; more pejoratively, Joe is a quintessential example
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of Holmes's "bad man."3 Assume further that not only is Joe without
a conscience but he faces no informal external sanctions either, such
as social norms against tax noncompliance. Either his friends,
neighbors, co-workers, and fellow corporate managers are utterly
indifferent to Joe's reputation for paying his taxes, or he is indifferent
to their opinions.
Given all of these simplifying assumptions, Joe's decision
regarding whether to undertake the particular transaction in question,
and whether to report the transaction on his tax return in the desired
manner, will depend on his ex ante assessment of (1) the probability
that the particular tax position in question will be discovered and
scrutinized by the Service, (2) the probability that, if detected, the
position would be rejected by the Service and ultimately by a court,
and (3) the size of the penalty in the event of both detection and
rejection. 4 Obviously Joe would not be able to estimate these variables
with great precision, but presumably he would give it his best shot or
pay a tax advisor to do so. It also seems sensible to assume that Joe
would invest in additional information, up to the point at which the
marginal cost of the additional information equals the marginal
benefit gained from the information. Again, assuming there is some
residual uncertainty even after these investments in information are
made, then the question of whether the deal is profitable to Joe will
depend on this evaluation of uncertain tax law and uncertain tax law
enforcement.
That is Joe's perspective. What about society's perspective? What
does society want Joe to do when the substantive content of the law
can only be estimated?5 Start with the two obvious and extreme
3 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459
(1897). Holmes states:

If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad
man, who cares only for the material consequences which such knowledge
enables him to predict, not as a good one, who finds his reasons for
conduct, whether inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of
conscience.
Id.
4 Later in this article, I relax some of these assumptions and explore the
implications for my analysis.
5 There is an inherent difficulty in specifying what is the "right thing to do" in
this context. Whether one has a consequentialist or deontological conception of
ethical behavior, identifying the proper course of conduct when the substantive law is
uncertain is problematic. In general, we might be able to agree that a taxpayer who is
operating under conditions of substantive legal uncertainty ought to (and perhaps
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positions. First, one could hold the view that Joe should go through
with the transaction in question only if the tax position that makes the
deal attractive - the tax-deferral or the special tax loss or special tax
credit or whatever - is certain to be upheld by the Service and the
courts. That is, Joe should adopt the particular interpretation only if
he is certain that Congress intended for the preference to apply to the
particular type of transaction that he is considering and to the
particular class of taxpayers of which he is a member. Alternatively,
one could hold the view that, so long as the tax position in question is
not clearly and indisputably forbidden by the Code, the taxpayer
should feel free to go through with it even if extraneous evidence, or
common sense, makes clear that Congress did not have the taxpayer
or his type of transaction in mind for this particular tax benefit.
Obviously, neither of these extreme positions is the right answer.
Rather, the right approach will depend on the circumstances. Indeed,
this article contends that, when the substantive tax rules' meanings are
uncertain, as applied to a taxpayer's particular situation, the taxpayer
should (and inevitably will) make his decision based on his, or his
legal expert's, probabilistic assessment of what the law actually is or what a court would say that it is. I argue further that the formal
penalties for tax underpayment should incorporate arid enforce this
concept of probabilistic compliance. Interestingly, as the discussion
below explains, the existing tax penalties to some extent already take
this approach.
Part I of this article explains the primary sources of uncertainty in
the income tax laws. Part II operationalizes the concept of substantive
tax law uncertainty by adopting a probabilistic understanding of
substantive law and by describing what I call the "tax compliance
continuum." Part III adopts the assumption of "detection certainty,"
the idea that every tax position actually is scrutinized by the Service
and demonstrates the deterrence benefits of a strict liability tax
penalty regime, especially in terms of its ability to induce taxpayers to
behave optimally with respect to ex ante legal uncertainty. Part IV

should be induced by the law to) take tax positions that are in some sense reasonable,
that represent neither abuse of the system nor charity to the government. Specifying
what this concept of reasonableness entails is not a simple task and is beyond the
scope of this article, although I will say a bit more about the question as the article
proceeds. Unsurprisingly, however, the analysis in this article is largely
consequentialist in orientation; as such, it conflates the ethical question of what
course of action the taxpayer ought to follow, even if she could be certain that she will
be undetected, with the law enforcement question about the incentives the law ought
to create with respect to taxpayer behavior.
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introduces the problem of "detection uncertainty," known in the tax
context colloquially as the "audit lottery," and shows how, under
certain assumptions, the classic Bentham-Becker punitive penalty can
induce taxpayers to internalize the expected tax liability associated
with substantively uncertain tax positions. Part V explores the role
that tax transaction liability insurance, whether privately or publicly
provided, could play in such a strict liability tax penalty regime with a
punitive Bentham-Becker penalty. Part VI explains (1) why, under
traditional deterrence assumptions and assuming a fully deterring
Bentham-Becker penalty, a fault-based tax penalty regime is inferior
to a strict liability regime, but (2) why, assuming the Bentham-Becker
penalty is unrealistic, a fault-based regime might be the second-most
optimal.
II.

SOURCES OF TAX LAW UNCERTAINTY

Before the analysis can get under way, an initial question is: why
is there substantive tax law uncertainty in the first place? Those with
only a passing familiarity with the U.S. tax laws might question the
plausibility of the claim that the tax law is rife with uncertainty. After
all, the U.S. federal income tax system is among the most detailed and
comprehensive legal regimes in the world. Given the thousands of
pages of the Code and umpteen-thousands of pages of Treasury
Regulations,6 the nonexpert might be tempted to conclude that
precise tax treatment of every conceivable transaction should be
derivable from the existing tax laws, so long as one has the time to
read and the expertise to understand the Code and regulations - or
has the resources to hire someone else to do it. Everyone realizes, of
course, that the Code is inscrutable to the common man but surely the
tax cognoscenti, whose opinions can be bought for a price, can find
the answers in all of those pages. For two general reasons, however,
there is, and likely will always be, considerable uncertainty in the tax
laws. The first has to do with the complexity of the laws. The second
has to do with unintended gaps or loopholes in the law.
By most accounts, the U.S. federal income tax is "the
paradigmatic system of rules" rather than standards. 7 A taxpayer's tax
6 The full text of Title 26 of the U.S. Code was, at the time this footnote was
written, 3387 pages long. According to the U.S. Government Printing Office, there
are 13,458 pages of federal regulations devoted to interpreting the tax laws.
7 D avid A. Weisbach, Formalism in the Tax Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 860, 860
(1999). According to conventional legal theory, the distinction between rules and
standards turns on the degree of ex ante versus ex post specification of the content of
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liability is determined by applying a precise rate schedule to that
taxpayer's taxable income. This sounds simple enough but, as already
mentioned, the number of words in the Code that must be consulted
to determine one's income tax liability is staggering. Furthermore, the
level of specificity, and hence the complexity, with which the Code
defines terms and explains procedures is legendary. Some of this
complexity results from Congress's habitual attempts to enact social
policy into the Code, whether it be subsidizing a particular form of
investment (such as research and development) or a particular class of
taxpayers (such as families or the poor). Another source of complexity
is the attempts by Congress and the Treasury Department to close
unintended loopholes in the tax laws, discussed further below.
Whatever the source, the complexity of the tax rules is a primary
source of substantive legal uncertainty. This sort of uncertainty is the
primary reason why so many individual taxpayers either have their
returns prepared by professionals or rely on computer programs such
as Turbotax for assistance. Every year, as the Code increases in length
and complexity, more taxpayers find it useful to seek expert help to
reduce the uncertainty associated with filing their returns.8
Complexity-induced uncertainty is a problem that plagues not only
unsophisticated individuals but also wealthy individuals and large
corporations who can afford expert legal advice.
A second source of substantive legal uncertainty in the tax law is
somewhat less familiar to nonexperts, although it is well known
the legal norm in question. That is, a rule in this taxonomy is a legal norm whose
application to particular situations is precisely and thoroughly specified in advance of
the occurrence of the regulated activity in question. Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus
Standards: A n Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 561-62 (1992). With a rule, then,
the role of the ex post adjudicator, the agency or court or whoever, is merely to
determine what the facts are and which rule is applicable. By contrast, a standard
leaves the contents of the legal norm vague such that the ex post adj udicator has
greater flexibility, and greater responsibility, in deciding what the precise content of
the legal norm is and how to apply it to particular situations after they arise.
According to the economically oriented rules-standards literature, a rule makes sense
when (1) the precise application of the legal norm to particular situations is relatively
easy to define or identify in advance and (2) when the rule is expected to be applied
with great frequency. By contrast, a standard may be preferred when an ex ante
determination of the optimal conduct is relatively difficult and when the norm in
question will be applied by the ex post adj udicator relatively infrequently. See
generally Colin S. D iver, The Optimal Precision ofAdministrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J.
65 (1983); Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal
Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974).
8 Eric Toder, Changes in Tax Preparation Methods, 1993-2003, 107 TAX NOTES
75 9 (May 9, 2005).
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among tax lawyers, accountants, and even beginning tax students.
Although there are obvious reasons to have numerous detailed tax
rules (for example, to set out clearly the tax treatment of the most
frequent types of transactions), there is simply no way for Congress or
the Treasury Department to anticipate every contingency and provide
in advance the precise tax treatment of every conceivable transaction
or investment.9 The world is just too complex. Even if it were
conceivable to fully specify the Code in this extreme sense, doing so
would be unreasonable. At some point, the increased degree of ex
ante precision in the law is outweighed by the cost of figuring out such
details in advance and by the loss of flexibility that accompanies ex
ante rulemaking. This is the source of the unintended loopholes
mentioned above. 10
The problem of unintended loopholes appears especially bad
when one considers taxpayers' incentives to find (or some would say,
to create) these unintended gaps and exploit them to their advantage.
Once an unintended loophole is found to work for one taxpayer, there
is a natural tendency for others to use it as well. Thus, what starts as a
small gap in the tax laws can, under the right conditions, become a
yawning chasm and the ultimate result can be both inefficiency
(because taxpayers alter their investment decisions in the effort to
minimize their taxes) and maldistribution of resources (because the
ability to exploit tax loopholes is not evenly or otherwise fairly
distributed across taxpayers). 11 When this process of unintended
loophole discovery and exploitation occurs, it is a virtual necessity that
the Service and the courts be empowered to apply some general anti
abuse gap filler, some statutory interpretive standard (in the rules
standards sense of the word) that limits these opportunities. Examples
9 See Richard Posner, Statutory Interpretation: In the Classroom and in the
Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 811 (1983). Posner notes:

The basic reason why statutes are so frequently ambiguous in application is
not that they are poorly drafted - though many are - and not that the
legislators failed to agree on j ust what they wanted to accomplish in the
statute - though often they do fail - but that a statute necessarily is
drafted in advance of, and with imperfect appreciation for the problems
that will be encountered in, its application.
Id. (citing EDWARD LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 30-31 (1949)).
10
An intentional loophole is different. Although for some that term might be
oxymoronic (some consider the term loophole to entail a lack of intentionality on the
part of the lawmaker), it is possible to conceive of an intended tax loophole as a way
to describe those provisions in the tax laws designed to subsidize certain activities.
11
See Weisbach, supra note 7, at 868.
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of these anti-avoidance standards in tax law are the economic
substance and business purposes doctrines. 12 The use of such anti
avoidance standards, however, comes at a cost to the system.
Employing these ex post anti-avoidance standards increases ex ante
substantive legal uncertainty, as taxpayers cannot know for sure in
advance where the Service or a court will draw the economic
substance or sham transaction line after the fact - just as a driver
cannot know for certain where the negligent-driver line will be drawn.
The uncertainty created by the existence of anti-avoidance doctrines is
generally a good thing when compared with the alternative of
allowing taxpayers to exploit all unintended loopholes with absolute
impunity.
One conclusion that follows from the preceding discussion is that
some level of substantive tax law uncertainty is inevitable. This is not
to say of course that Congress and the Treasury Department have no
control over the amount, degree, or even the type of legal uncertainty
that exists. Obviously they do. They can invest more or less time in
specifying the rules in advance, more or less effort in avoiding
unnecessary and confusing complexity. Indeed, there is a large
political science literature that explores the question why and under
what circumstances legislatures would intentionally write vague or
ambiguous statutes, pointing out legislatures' desires to shift the
responsibility of unpopular decisions to enforcement agencies, to
courts, 13 or to a legislature's inability to reach a stable consensus on
legislative language. 1 4 Moreover, particularly in the tax context, it is
possible to conceive of Congress, perhaps with the cooperation of the
Treasury Department, actually using the level of legal uncertainty as
another tool in their tax enforcement toolbox. That is, if taxpayers are
thought to be risk-averse, it is not difficult to imagine how
strategically increasing tax law uncertainty, and hence the variance of
12

DANIEL

N.

SHAVIRO, CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY:

1 -2 (2004) .
See Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL
L. REV. 1, 55-62 (1982) ; Morris P. Fiorina, Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms:
Legal Process or Administrative Process?, 39 PUB. CHOICE 33, 46-52 (1982) ; Mark A.
Graber, The Non-Majoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7
STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35 (1993); Ran Hirschi, The Political Origins of Judicial
Empowerment Through Constitutionalization: Lessons from Four Constitutional
Revolutions, 25 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 91, 104 (2000); Eli M. Salzberger, A Positive
Analysis of the Doctrine of Separation of Powers, or: Why Do We Have an
Independent Judiciary?, 13 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 349, 361-66 (1993).
14 See, e.g., David B. Spence, A Public Choice Progressivism, Continued, 87
CORNELL L. REV. 397, 432 (2002).
WHY THEY ARE A PROBLEM AND WHAT WE CAN Do ABOUT IT
13
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possible tax outcomes, in some contexts could serve the same function
as increasing noncompliance penalties directly. 15 Having said all of
that, this article focuses on legal uncertainty that is unavoidable by
lawmakers. Therefore, for most of this article, I assume that the
choice of the optimal tax penalty and tax liability rule should ignore
the effects of the penalty and rule on Congress's decision to increase
or decrease the certainty of the laws.
Ill. A CONCEPTION OF UNCERTAIN ( OR PROBABILISTIC) TAX LAW:
THE TAX COMPLIANCE CONTINUUM

The next step in the analysis is to provide some functional content
to the idea of substantive legal uncertainty. Uncertainty itself is a
vague term. It could mean that the law is so vague that the taxpayer
cannot begin to guess what it prohibits or allows. Some laws may elicit
such an extreme reaction. The analysis of this article, however, will
not provide much help in addressing that sort of profound legal
uncertainty. Rather, it will focus on situations in which the law is not
certain, but educated guesses can still be made about what the law
means and how it will be applied to a given situation.
One way to operationalize this conception of substantive legal
uncertainty is to array the possible range of tax positions (or
interpretations of the tax laws) along a continuum according to their
probability of success on the merits assuming they are reviewed by a
court. 16 On one end of this continuum lie tax positions that are
indisputably illegal. The probability that the Service and a court would
uphold such positions if asked to do so is zero. Taking such a position
on one's tax return would accurately be characterized as outright tax
evasion. On the other end of the continuum are tax positions that are
clearly legal, in the sense that the probability that the Service and the
courts would sustain them on the merits, if presented with the
question, is equal to one. In between these two extreme points are an
infinite number of possible tax positions with varying ex ante
probabilities of success on the merits. Figure 1 captures the idea of
this tax compliance continuum.

15 This possibility was formally demonstrated in Suzanne Scotchmer & Joel
Slemrod, Randomness in Tax Enforcement, 38 J. Pus. ECON. 17 (1989).
16
Thus, one way of resolving the problem of substantive legal uncertainty is to
engage in what Michael Abramowicz calls "predictive decisionmaking." Michael
Abramowicz, Predictive Decisionmaking, 92 VA. L. REV. 69 (2006) .
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FIGURE

1. MEASURING SUBSTANTIVE LEGAL UNCERTAINTY
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This continuum is useful not only because the two endpoints illustrate
the most extreme positions, but also because the continuum allows a
whole range of tax positions to be graded on the basis of their relative
aggressiveness according to their relative position on the continuum.
Thus, as we move from right to left along the continuum in Figure 1,
the various tax positions represented by the continuum become
increasingly aggressive in the sense that their probability of being
rejected on the merits by a court, if detected, increases.11
It is easy to conceive of tax positions that would fall on either end
of this continuum. On the clearly illegal side are those taxpayers who
simply decline to report cash income or intentionally take deductions
for expenses that were never incurred. Such behavior constitutes
obvious illegal tax evasion. Obvious tax evasion might also include
hiding income in illegal foreign accounts. Given the zero or near-zero
probability that such positions would be upheld on the merits if
detected, the only motivation for taking them is the hope of going
undetected. On the other end of the spectrum, there are many tax
positions that are clearly legal: a simple business expense deduction or
the exclusion of an item that is clearly a gift. There is little dispute that
the tax treatment of many transactions is clear and that the answer to
many particular tax questions can be known with a high degree of
certainty.
More interesting are the many tax positions that fall between zero
and one in terms of probability of success on the merits. As any tax
practitioner or any student in an introductory federal income tax class
can tell you, almost all of the interesting tax questions fall in this
range. This holds true regardless of whether the area is corporate,
17 It is possible that substantive legal uncertainty in many areas of law might
usefully be understood in terms of this legal uncertainty continuum. In this article, I
focus exclusively on substantive uncertainty in the tax laws.
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partnership, or individual income taxation. In fact, a reasonable case
can be made that the vast majority of the tax issues that end up being
decided by a court had, at the time the transaction was planned and
carried out, a positive-but-less-than-one probability of success on the
merits. Even the most infamous tax-shelter cases, the largely extinct
1970s real-estate-limited-partnership kind as well as the more recent
corporate-shelter variety, would doubtless fall somewhere to the right
of "clearly illegal" on the continuum. 1 8 Of course, for most tax-shelter
transactions, there would be disagreement about exactly where on the
continuum the various shelter transactions fall. 19 But for almost all
such transactions, one could at least imagine using something like the
continuum above to assess the relative aggressiveness of the
taxpayers' positions.
Conceiving of the tax compliance decision in such probabilistic,
predictive terms will often not comport with reality. Although we may
be accustomed to viewing some taxpayers as quintessential rational
actors - I have in mind those taxpayers who spend a great deal of
time and money to find loopholes in the law - it is quite a different
matter to imagine the average individual taxpayer making a
probabilistic calculation to determine what the substantive tax law in
fact is. Hence this analysis may not apply to average taxpayers filing
out their 1040EZ. At least for sophisticated taxpayers, however, (by
which I mean taxpayers with sufficient resources and incentives to
hire expert legal advisors) such probabilistic estimates are a part of
the game.20 In fact, the Code and regulations make the application of
18

For a general description of the difference between the individual tax shelters
of the 1970s and the corporate shelters of the 1990s, see Joseph Bankman, The New
Market in Corporate Tax Shelters, 83 TAX NOTES 1775 (June 21, 1999).
19 This point is proven by the fact that highly regarded tax experts often disagree
over the characterization of a given transaction as an " abusive tax shelter" or an
example of "legitimate tax planning." See, e.g., James S. Eustice, Abusive Corporate
Tax Shelters: Old "Brine" in New Bottles, 55 TAX L. REV. 135, 158-59 (2002); D avid P.
Hariton, Kafka and the Tax Shelter, 57 TAX L. REV. 1 (2003).
20
I do not mean to suggest that there is a large class of taxpayers who are
constantly doing probability calculations to determine what the law is with regard to
every tax provision. However, with respect to the tax law provisions that (1) are
uncertain in application and (2) can have a significant effect on tax liabilities, many
sophisticated taxpayers in fact do such probabilistic calculations. Either explicitly or
implicitly, they assess what the Internal Revenue Service (Service) and a court will
likely say the law is. This sort of rational cost-benefit calculation with respect to
uncertain tax provisions may be very widespread, insofar as even many individual
taxpayers rely on professional tax return preparers, who are presumably incentivized
to consider the probabilities of various legal outcomes.
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tax penalties for noncompliance depend on such probabilistic
predictive assessments. In that sense, the existing tax penalty structure
already incorporates something like the tax compliance continuum
described above. That is to say, if the Service and the courts determine
after the fact that a particular position taken by a taxpayer is wrong and thus that the taxpayer owes additional taxes - then the
determination of whether the taxpayer must pay additional penalties
depends on the Service's (and, if the case winds up in court, the
court's) ex post assessment of the taxpayer's ex ante probability of
success on the merits.
To get a sense of how a probabilistic predictive analysis of the
meaning of an uncertain legal rule might work, consider a current tax
compliance penalty provision. Under existing law, if a taxpayer
understates her tax liability (that is, the Service and courts determine
that she took an impermissible tax position), she will generally have to
pay, in addition to the back-taxes and interest, a penalty of 20% of the
understated tax unless she can persuade the Service or a court ex post
that the position in question ex ante had approximately a 40% chance
or better of prevailing on the merits assuming the issue were reviewed
by a court.21 Such uncertain legal positions are said to have
"substantial authority."22 Thus, the current taxpayer penalty regime
for tax underpayments incorporates a version of the sort of
21
22

I.RC. § 6662.
More precisely, the 20% substantial understatement penalty will be assessed
unless the taxpayer can demonstrate ex post that she ex ante had "substantial
authority" for the position. I.RC. § 6662(d)(2)(B). The official meaning of
"substantial authority" found in the Treasury Regulations is maddeningly circular. See
Treas. Reg. § l. 6662-4(d)(3) (as amended in 2003) ("There is substantial authority for
the tax treatment of an item only if the weight of the authorities supporting the
treatment is substantial in relation to the weight of authorities supporting contrary
treatment."). The concept of substantial authority is further defined, however, with
reference to where it falls on something like the tax compliance continuum in the text
above. Thus, substantial authority is understood as an objective test that is "less
stringent than the more likely than not standard (the standard that is met when there
is a greater than 50% likelihood of the position being upheld), but more stringent
than the reasonable basis standard." Treas. Reg. § l .6662-4(d)(2) (as amended in
2003). These latter two standards are discussed further in the text immediately below.
The actual 40% figure is found nowhere in the Internal Revenue Code (Code) or
regulations but is often suggested by practitioners and commentators as a rough
statistical approximation of the idea. See, e. g. , STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION,
103D CONG., COMPARISON OF RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE STAFF
AND

TREASURY

RECOMMENDATIONS

RELATING

PROVISIONS OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE

at http://www.house.gov/jct/x-79-99.pdf.

TO

PENALTY

AND

INTEREST

13 (Joint Comm. Print 1999), available
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probabilistic predictive assessment that I describe above; implicit in
the whole analysis is the assumption that the substantive tax law itself
is uncertain. This definition of substantial authority is not the only
example of probabilistically assessed tax penalties. Tax penalties can
also be avoided if the taxpayer can show that (1) the tax position at
issue was disclosed to the Service, and (2) the position had a
"reasonable basis" in the law (i.e., a 20% chance of prevailing on the
merits, assuming detection).23 Thus, if you bring your uncertain tax
position to the Service's attention, you are allowed to be somewhat
more aggressive, in the sense of taking a position that is a little further
to the left on the tax compliance continuum.24
There are other examples of the probabilistic reasoning of this
sort in the area of tax enforcement. For certain categories of
transactions that the Service has reason to believe are of questionable
legitimacy, because of the nature of the transactions or because of the
Service's experience with similar transactions in the past, special rules
apply. For example, these transactions must be reported to the
Service; hence the term "reportable" transactions.25 In addition, to
avoid underpayment penalties for such transactions, the taxpayer
must be able to show not only that the tax position in question had
substantial authority (as defined above) but also that she reasonably
believed the position was "more likely than not" correct.26 That is, she

23

I.RC.§ 6662(d)(2)(B).
This lower standard, or willingness to waive penalties for relatively aggressive
tax positions that are disclosed, does not apply to so-called "tax shelters," defined
here as "(I) a partnership or other entity, (II) any investment plan or arrangement, or
(III) any other plan or arrangement, if a significant purpose of such partnership,
entity, plan, or arrangement is the avoidance or evasion of Federal income tax."
I.RC. § 6662(d)(2)(C)(ii). Thus, if your transaction can be characterized as a tax
shelter, even if you disclose it to the Service, you incur risk penalties for substantial
tax understatements unless you can show that the position had at least a 40% chance
of winning on the merits. There is also a general exception to any substantial
understatement penalty if taxpayers can demonstrate that they had "reasonable cause
for" and "acted in good faith with respect to" the position in question. I.RC.
§ 6664(d). I will have more to say about this "reasonableness" exception below.
25 "Reportable transactions" include, for example, "listed transactions" (which
are specific tax avoidance transactions that have been publicly identified by the
Service for special scrutiny), "confidential transactions" (which are done under
conditions in which the tax advisor has insisted on some sort of confidentiality
agreement), transactions that involve "contractual protection" (where the taxpayer
has right to a full or partial refund of the tax advisor's fees if the position is not
sustained). Treas. Reg.§ l.6011-4(b) (1960).
26
I.RC.§ 6664(d).
24
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must have reasonably had the view that the position would fall to the
right of the mid-point on the tax compliance continuum of Figure l.27
As if all these probabilistic standards were not enough, there are
also the rules governing tax preparer penalties. Thus, a tax preparer
can be penalized for signing a return or endorsing a tax position that
does not have at least a "realistic possibility of success," which is
sometimes quantified to mean at least a 33 % chance of winning on the
merits, assuming detection is certain.28 Alternatively, if the position in
question is disclosed to the Service, the preparer can still sign the
return and avoid penalties so long as the position is at least not
"frivolous," which some have quantified as something greater than a
10% chance of winning on the merits.29 Taxpayers themselves also are
subject to special penalties for filing frivolous returns and an even
greater penalty for taking positions that are clearly illegal.
If one wanted to array all of these various points along the
relative continuum of uncertain tax positions, it would look like this:
FIGURE 2. MEASURING SUBSTANTIVE LEGAL UNCERTAINTY
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All of these various penalties depend not on whether the
particular tax position at issue is legal or illegal, but on the position's
ex ante probability of being legal or illegal as determined either by the
21

Id.
Treas. Reg.§ 1. 6694-2(c) (as amended in 1992). Again, the percentage chance
of success is a rough statistical approximation of the idea. See, e.g. , STAFF OF JOINT
28

COMM.

ON

TAXATION,

COMMITTEE, supra
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See,
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note 22, at 13.
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Service, a court, or the taxpayer. Later in this article I will return to
the question of whether the above described penalty scheme, or some
modified version of it, can be justified on deterrence grounds. But first
let us logically consider the prior questions, mentioned in the
introduction: what is the socially optimal ex ante probability-of
winning-on-the-merits threshold that taxpayers ought to apply in
making tax planning decisions? And what tax penalty regime creates
the incentives most likely to achieve that result?
At this point, I need to be clear about what I mean by "optimal"
and "efficient" in this context. In one sense, the efficient result in this
example would be if the tax could be designed so that Joe Taxpayer
could utterly ignore it and thus, make his investment decisions entirely
on the basis of his pre-tax calculations. Put differently, the most
efficient, or least distortive, tax is not an income tax at all but some
form of lump sum tax, perhaps a head tax. I am assuming that society,
through Congress, has decided that the overall social-welfare
maximizing form of taxation is an income tax, one that allocates tax
burdens in a particular way depending on taxpayers' individual levels
of income and that, despite its distortive effects, such an income tax is
overall socially optimal. Thus, when I speak of designing the
"optimal" tax penalty, I mean the penalty that induces compliance
with the law, taking the level of taxation and allocation of the tax
burden across different levels of income as given - as having been
decided (in some sense correctly, or socially optimally) by Congress.30
IV.

STRI CT TAX LIABILITY AND THE OPTIMAL MERITS
PROBABILITY THRESHOLD

To begin to answer these questions, consider the example of Joe
Taxpayer in greater detail. Imagine Joe is considering a single
transaction or investment that is guaranteed to produce a pre-tax
profit of $75. Now assume further that there are only two possible tax
treatments of that transaction: either it will produce a tax liability of
$1 00 or it will produce no tax liability at all.31 Thus, the overall
profitability of the transaction depends on the ultimate tax
consequences; it either produces an after-tax gain of $75 or an after-

30 Another way of understanding this point is to imagine that Congress, in its
infinite wisdom, understands that the tax laws will have some level of irreducible
uncertainty, and that the optimal penalty regime will need to be adjusted to take this
fact into account.
All of the numbers are assumed to be discounted to present value.
31
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tax loss of $25.32 The problem, of course, is that Joe does not know
with certainty what the tax consequences will be. This is one of those
transactions for which neither Congress nor the Treasury Department
has clearly specified the tax treatment. Hence, the best that Joe can do
is estimate, or have his lawyer or accountant estimate, the probability
that the zero-tax interpretation of the transaction will be upheld if
detected and then make his investment decision accordingly.
Let us also assume that the tax law uncertainty that Joe faces will
be resolved only after he has made the investment and only after
several years - however long it takes for the Service to select Joe's
return for audit and either reject or accept the tax position in question
or for the statute of limitations on that return year to run. This
assumption also implies that Joe cannot, at a reasonable cost or within
a reasonable time, get a private letter ruling to resolve the uncertainty
before the investment is made. Assume that, once the transaction is
undertaken, it cannot reasonably be unwound or reversed should the
tax treatment on which the taxpayer relies happen to be struck down.
Rather, in the event the tax position turns out to be wrong, Joe simply
has to absorb the extra taxes and penalties, which in this case would
again mean that the transaction, from an ex post perspective, would
be a net after-tax loser. On a related point, I assume initially that it is
impossible to purchase private insurance against the possibility of an
adverse tax decision and, in any event, that Joe is risk neutral in the
sense of being indifferent between two prospects with differing levels
of variance but equal expected values. I relax these assumptions
below.33
Finally, begging the reader's indulgence, a few additional
assumptions common to the economic analysis of law are necessary
for the analysis to proceed. The particular implications of these
assumptions will be explored later in this article. First, recall the
assumptions from the introduction that the taxpayer is a rational actor
in the traditional sense and cares only about maximizing after-tax
returns. These are obviously essential to the deterrence analysis that
follows and are customary in the relevant deterrence literatures.
Second, it is assumed throughout this article that the federal tax laws,
32 In effect, I am assuming that even if the transaction has an expected after-tax
profit of only one cent, it will be enough to induce Joe Taxpayer to invest. This is
obviously an unrealistic assumption, but it is useful for purposes of simplicity and
does not detract from the overall point of the analysis.
33 The other assumption that is essential to this deterrence analysis is that Joe
has sufficient assets to pay whatever tax penalty is assessed ex post - that is, Joe is
not "judgment-proof."
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as ultimately interpreted by a court, represent the will of Congress
and are therefore presumptively social-welfare-maximizing. This
assumption has two components. First, whatever Congress intends for
the tax laws to mean is what maximizes social welfare; this includes
both the allocative and distributive consequences of the tax laws.
Thus, if Congress decides that a taxpayer who earns $30,000 should
pay 10% in taxes and a taxpayer who makes $200,000 should pay 30%
in taxes (perhaps because, for example, our society has decided that
high-income people place a lower marginal value on money than do
low-income people) then that result is, in some sense, social-welfare
maximizing.34 Second, whenever it is unclear what tax treatment
Congress intended for a particular transaction, that question is
answered definitively and accurately when a court renders a tax
decision. Both of these assumptions are obviously unrealistic. We all
know how Congress (with the President's help) can and does
mismanage the tax system. Courts are likewise notorious for getting
tax decisions wrong. Nevertheless, to render the deterrence analysis
tractable, these assumptions - that Congressional intent is welfare
maximizing and that courts are always right - are necessary.
Moreover, if one is especially troubled by the quality of Congress's tax
lawmaking record or by the courts' performance in tax cases, those
issues should be addressed directly.35
With that lengthy but necessary setup, we can now begin to isolate
the factors that determine what the optimal ex ante tax compliance
incentives would be in Joe Taxpayer's situation. This part of the
analysis relies on the traditional lens of deterrence theory as it has
been developed in the economic analysis of legal rules.36 In that
34 Such a conclusion, of course, does not entail the further conclusion that
achieving this result, collecting 10% from the $30,000 person and 30% from the
$200,000 person, is worth any cost. On this view, even the goal of achieving society's
distributional goals is subject to some budget constraint.
35 I also realize that the vast majority of tax controversies end with a settlement
between the Service and the taxpayer, and thus the courts never get an opportunity in
most cases to render a final decision on the merits of most questions of tax law
uncertainty. Put differently, in most circumstances, the Service is the final "ex post
adjudicator" of the question of how the tax laws apply to a particular transaction. This
fact introduces further complications to the deterrence analysis. I ignore those
complications and assume that either the Service gets it right (and interprets the
unclear tax laws consistently with congressional intent and thus maximization of social
welfare) or the Service's decision gets reviewed by a court that sets things right.
36 See, e.g. , A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND
ECONOMICS 37-49 (1983); STEVEN SHAYELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW
(1987).
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literature, the two most important normative questions are (1) what is
the optimal liability rule - strict liability, some variant of negligence,
or fault; and (2) what is the optimal level of damages in the private
enforcement context, or the optimal fine in the public enforcement
context.37 Applying this framework, it should be clear as an initial
matter - although it is never expressed this way in the tax compliance
literature - that if Joe Taxpayer's position is certain to be scrutinized
by the Service because the probability of detection is one, then the
optimal tax liability rule is strict liability and the optimal fine is simply
the amount of additional taxes owed plus an appropriate interest
charge to account for the time value of money. This combination will
produce the right ex ante compliance incentives and will induce Joe to
make the investment described above only if it is efficient for him to
do so.
Interestingly, this conclusion suggests that such a strict tax liability
rule will induce the taxpayer to behave optimally with respect to the
question of legal uncertainty; in particular, it will give him the
incentive to choose the optimal threshold probability of success on the
merits. In the above example, the social-welfare-maximizing choice
would be for Joe to make the investment if the probability that the
position will be upheld on the merits is greater than 0.25, but not
otherwise. For any probability of success on the merits greater than
0.25, the transaction is a positive net-present-value investment after
taxes, but not otherwise.38 A few simple examples illustrate this point.
If the probability of success on the merits for this transaction was
30% , the expected tax cost associated with the investment would be
$70, still less than the pre-tax profit of $75; hence the deal, for Joe and
for society, is worth pursuing.39 If the probability of success on the
merits was 20% , the expected tax cost would be $80, making the deal
a $5 loser in after-tax terms.40 Given these numbers, the optimal merits
probability threshold is 25 % . This number is entirely an artifact of the

37 For a comprehensive survey of the economic analysis of deterrence in the
context of public enforcement of legal rules, see A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven
Shavell, The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law, in 1 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shaven eds., 2007).
38 If you know the pre-tax profit of the transaction will be $75 and you know the
potential tax outcomes are either zero or $100 in taxes, the optimal merits probability
threshold can be calculated by solving for x in the following equation: (x * 0) + ((1-x)
* 100)
75.
39 The expected tax cost using these numbers is calculated as follows: (0.3 * 0) +
(0. 7 * 100) $ 70.
40 (0.2 * 0) + (0.8 * 100)
$80.
=

=

=
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arbitrary parameters of the example but the more general point still
holds. Assuming detection certainty - the idea that every tax issue
gets evaluated by a court and thus that all ex ante uncertainty gets
resolved ex post - a rule of strict tax liability that requires the
taxpayer to pay the additional taxes ex post in the event the Service or
a court finds his position to have been wrong will induce him to
internalize his ex ante expected tax liability. This will work with
whatever numbers are used in the example.
To put the point even more generally, when taxpayers face
conditions of legal uncertainty, social welfare is maximized if they
make investment decisions on the basis of their best estimate of the
ultimate resolution of that uncertainty. To achieve this result, society
wants to make individuals and firms internalize the expected value of
the harm that their decisions might cause; harm, in this instance,
would be the amount of under-paid taxes. This conclusion is
consistent with the conventional wisdom in the economic analysis of
tort law, where cost internalization through strict liability is well
understood to achieve efficiency in certain settings and under
assumptions similar to those made in this article.41 For example, in the
products liability context, if a product manufacturer is trying to decide
whether to manufacture and sell a particular product (or whether to
make a particular safety innovation in an existing product), the
existence of a strict liability tort rule induces that company ex ante to
take into account the expected harm that its product might cause (or
the expected reduction in harm that the safety innovation might
yield). In essence, this is what a strict liability rule in the tax context
does as well.
Thus, a regime that makes Joe Taxpayer pay the $1 00 in back
taxes in the event the Service and courts reject his tax position will
induce him to make the social-welfare-maximizing ex ante choice
regarding when to take advantage of a given legally uncertain tax
benefit.42 It is also worth making two other aspects of this conclusion
explicit. First, it highlights the fact that there is no a priori correct
merits probability threshold apart from what is optimal under the
41

See SHAYELL, supra note 36, at 23.
Henceforth, I ignore the requirement that the award include adequate interest
to account for the time value of money. This is a customary assumption in the
economic analysis of legal rules. In the real world, of course, the interest charge that
the law imposes on taxpayers for tax deficiencies does not precisely equal the rate at
which the taxpayer was able to invest those funds. The tax system's failure to calibrate
interest charges properly can produce over- or under-deterrence, just as if the amount
of taxes owed were over-stated or under-stated.
42
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circumstances as described above.43 Second, the optimal merits
probability threshold will depend on a number of factors including the
amount of the potential tax cost (or tax savings) associated with the
transaction if the taxpayer loses (or wins), the amount (and the
certainty) of the pre-tax profit expected from the transaction, and, if
we lower the assumption of risk neutrality, the taxpayer's taste for
risk, though I have assumed risk neutrality to this point. Thus, all else
equal, the higher the potential tax cost (or savings) associated with the
transaction, the higher the minimal threshold probability of success on
the merits will be.44 This makes intuitive sense. If the tax aspect of a
particular transaction is very large relative to the expected pre-tax
profit from that transaction, we want the taxpayer - and the taxpayer
herself should want - to be certain about the substantive law in
question before going forward with the deal. Along the same lines, the
relationship between the expected pre-tax profit and the optimal
merits probability threshold also makes intuitive sense. If the nontax
aspect of a particular deal is relatively large, compared to the tax
savings, the taxpayer can afford (and society would want her) to be
more aggressive in her interpretation of uncertain tax laws.
A number of interesting observations follow from this analysis.
First, even if the probability of success on the merits for a given tax
position is extremely low, it can be socially optimal for the taxpayer to
engage in the transaction and take the questionably legal position, so
long as she believes that the expected pre-tax profit from the
transaction exceeds the expected tax liability. This is a point that is
sufficiently counterintuitive (and interesting) to bear restating in a
slightly different way. Socially optimal behavior, in a world with
substantive legal uncertainty, can and often will include actions that
turn out, after the substantive legal uncertainty is resolved, to have
been illegal. That is just another way of saying that whenever there is
substantive legal uncertainty, it is not the case that inaction - or
43 This conclusion is largely a function of the current strong assumptions. Stated
again, I am assuming that the only deterrent here is the formal penalty. Not only is
Joe Taxpayer not subject to any i nformal sanctions from his colleagues or peers for
being too aggressive on his tax returns but he has no conscience either: he does
whatever is optimal under the law. Of course, informal sanctions do exist, and most
people do have a conscience; the entire deterrence calculus can change when those
facts are admitted. I return to this possibility at the end of this article.
44 To see this using my example, imagine that the potential tax outcomes were
multiplied by three (i.e., either $300 or $0 in taxes). In that case, the threshold
probability of success on the merits would be tripled as well (to 0.75). This can be
determined by setting the expected profit from the transaction ($75) equal to (x * 0) +
((1-x) * 300) and solving for x.
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declining to interpret the uncertain law in one's favor - is always the
best, most social-welfare-maximizing approach. Where the substantive
law is uncertain, a conservative interpretation of the law is not always
optimal; to the contrary, sometimes optimality calls for aggressiveness
in the face of substantive legal uncertainty.
This conclusion depends critically on the probability of detection
being one - that is, the complete absence of detection uncertainty. If
the probability of detection is less than one, this conclusion obviously
does not follow, unless there is a penalty large enough to approximate
the effect of detection certainty, as will be discussed at some length
below. So let me be very clear that I am not advocating a regime that
encourages or allows taxpayers to take tax positions that have a very
low probability of success on the merits - which is one way of
understanding what is normally meant by an "aggressive" tax position
- unless we have in place a deterrence regime that either makes
detection a certainty or imposes an ex post punitive penalty that has
roughly the same ex ante effect as certain detection.
A second interesting observation that flows from the analysis
above is that the strict tax liability rule works even for transactions
that promise no pre-tax profit, that is, in circumstances in which the
tax position in question - for example, the special deduction or credit
- is the factor making the deal potentially profitable. Strict tax
liability produces optimal compliance incentives not only in situations
in which the transaction depends on the tax outcome for its overall
profitability, but also in situations in which a transaction is expected to
produce a pre-tax loss. These sorts of transactions are of course the
source of much debate in the tax literature and are sometimes given
pejorative labels such as "abusive tax shelters" or transactions that
"lack economic substance."45 Even for such transactions, if the
probability of detection is 100%, and everyone knows this, a simple
strict tax liability rule optimizes taxpayer compliance incentives.
The Joe Taxpayer example can be tweaked slightly to illustrate
this last point. Assume now that the transaction is expected to lose $5
before taxes but promises the possibility of either producing a tax
45 Obviously, not all tax transactions are expected to have pre-tax losses, but
post-tax gains are considered abusive tax shelters. For example, some transactions
that are designed to exploit explicit tax subsidy provisions in the Code, which might
be called "intended loopholes," fall into this category. One of the biggest issues in the
tax shelter literature, arguably the central issue in that debate, is the question of how
to distinguish the unintended from the intended tax loopholes. For the purposes of
this article, again, I am assuming that the Service and the courts can figure this out in
their ex post evaluations of tax positions.
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liability of $50 (for an after-tax loss of $55) or, perhaps by producing a
credit or a loss deduction that can be used to offset taxes from some
other source, a net tax savings of $100 (for an after-tax gain of $95).
Given those possibilities, the break-even or optimal merits probability
threshold for Joe's situation is roughly 0.3. Thus, Joe will be willing to
engage in the transaction - and, from an efficiency perspective,
should be willing to engage in the transaction - if the probability that
this position will win on the merits is anything greater than 30% , but
not otherwise.46 Of course, the precise probability threshold is entirely
an artifact of the numbers that I have chosen for the example, but the
point is fairly general. Because the strict tax liability rule forces Joe to
internalize the ex ante expected value of his ex post tax liability, he
will invest in the transaction only if it is optimal to do so, so he will
choose the optimal merits probability threshold, whatever that may be
under the circumstances.
V. THE PROBLEM OF D ETECTION UNCERTAINTY AND THE
B ENTHAM-BECKER SOLUTION

The preceding analysis assumed, among many other things, that
the probability of detection - the combined probability that the
taxpayer's return would be selected for audit and the particular issue
in question would be scrutinized - was equal to one. This is an
especially fanciful assumption in the tax context, at least with respect
to the sort of sophisticated transactions that this article is focusing on
- transactions that involve navigating the intended and unintended
loopholes in the Code. For such transactions, the probability of
detection is notoriously low. This is true both because the audit rate
itself is far less than 100% and because, even when a return is audited,
there is a good chance that such tax positions will go unnoticed by the
Service.47 Although no one knows what the precise probability of
46 To find this percentage, set (x * 100) + ((1-x) * (-50)) equal to -5, and then
solve for x.
47 According to the most recent Service statistics, the 2005 audit rates were as
follows: all individuals (0. 9%); individuals with under $25,000 of income (1.5% );
individuals with under $100,000 of income (0. 8%); corporations with assets over $10
million (20%); corporations with assets over $250 million (44% ); corporations with
assets under $10 million (0.8%). INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DATA BOOK 2005,
PUBL'N 55B, at 19 (2006), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/05databk.pdf.
Based on research from data from earlier years, it appears that, of those taxpayers
who are audited, only a small percentage (as low as 4% ) are actually penalized. James
Andreoni, Brian Erard & Jonathan Feinstein, Tax Compliance, 36 J. ECON. LIT. 818,
821 (1998). Note that audit rates for individuals are much higher for certain types of
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detection is for any given type of tax position (even the Service, which
does have data on audit rates for different categories of taxpayers and
has confidential information about its own enforcement priorities,
cannot know what the ultimate detection probability is for a particular
tax position), such probability is almost certainly very low for many of
the transactions that characterize the zone of substantive legal
uncertainty. The result, of course, is that a tax penalty regime of strict
liability in which the only penalty is the "harm" - the additional taxes
plus interest - woefully under-deters. Thus, with probability of
detection significantly below one, unless we assume massive levels of
risk aversion, taxpayers have an incentive to engage in transactions
(and take tax positions) that are far too aggressive from an overall
social welfare perspective. Indeed, the current problem of the tax gap,
the difference between the taxes owed and the taxes paid, is almost
certainly a result of the fact that the vast majority of taxpayers who
underpay their taxes never get caught, and everyone knows that.
The effect of detection uncertainty on taxpayer aggressiveness can
easily be illustrated by making a small but important change to the
Joe Taxpayer example. Imagine the situation as described in the
original example above (a $75 expected pre-tax profit with a potential
tax liability of $1 00 or $0), except that the probability of detection is
not 100% but is, for example, 1 %. If the fine is then set equal to the
amount of back-taxes owed with no additional penalty, the taxpayer
would have an incentive to make the investment, in reliance on the tax
position in question, even if the probability of winning the position on
the merits were zero and that particular tax position were clearly
illegal.48 Indeed, in the current Joe Taxpayer example, Joe would have
an incentive to make the investment, despite the position being
unquestionably illegal, for any probability of detection less than
75%.49 Again, the particular numbers are arbitrary, but the principle is
well known among tax practitioners and analysts: the lower the

errors, such as omitting income that is reported on information returns. Joel Slemrod,
Trust in Public Finance 9 (Mich. Ross Sch. of Bus., Office of Tax Policy Research,
Working Paper No. 2002-7, 2002), available at http://www.bus.umich.edu/OTPR/
WP2002-7paper.pdf.
48 The expected value of the $100 in taxes would be $1, although the probability
of winning on the merits if detected is zero and $1 is obviously less than the pre-tax
profit expected from the transaction.
49 Since the expected pre-tax profit is $75, the expected fine would have to be
$75 or greater. If the position is patently illegal, given the potential tax liability of
$100, the expected tax liability will be less than $75 for any probability of detection
less than 75% .
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probability of detection - all else being equal
the larger the
incentive that taxpayers have to take aggressive tax positions.50
The problem of low probabilities of detection is one of the oldest
and most thoroughly discussed issues in the entire deterrence
literature. At least since Jeremy Bentham, theorists have understood
the relationship between the probability of detection, the magnitude
of the penalty, and the appropriate level of deterrence. 51 It was Gary
Becker who first formalized this relationship in the criminal law
context and who further identified the optimal solution to the
deterrence problem, assuming that the cost of increasing the
probability of detection - that is, money spent on detecting law
violators - is a deadweight social loss. Becker's solution is to spend
relatively little on detection, but to increase the ex post penalty until
the potential perpetrator is induced ex ante to act as if the probability
of detection were one.52 Such a Bentham-Becker penalty is calculated
by dividing the harm caused by the probability of detection. To
illustrate, if a crime is expected to cause a harm of 100, such that the
optimal cost-internalizing sanction would be $100, but the probability
of detection is 0.01, the optimal fine would be $10,000
that is, the
amount of the harm (100) divided by the probability of detection
(0.01). Or, if you prefer multiplying, the amount of harm multiplied by
the reciprocal of the detection probability. The theory is that such a
penalty makes the expected value of the fine equal the harm. Thus, in
general, so long as (1) the ex post adjudicator can accurately
determine both the ex ante probability of detection and the amount of
the harm (for purposes of this article, the actual taxes owed as
determined by the adjudicator in resolving the legal uncertainty), (2)
taxpayers or their advisors are aware of this fact, and (3) taxpayers
have sufficient assets at risk to care about large ex post penalty, then
the use of such an ex post penalty regime can create the proper ex
ante tax compliance incentives.53 Indeed, under such a regime, people
-

50 The one possible qualification to this observation involves the interaction
between formal and informal sanctions. If people are prevented from taking illegal
positions by informal norms, either internal ones such as their own consciences or
external ones, like their reputations, for example, then this relationship between rates
of detection and willingness to take aggressive or clearly illegal positions may change.
51 Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation,
in 1 WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 1 , 86-91 (John Bowring ed., 1843).
5 2 Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL.
ECON. 169 (1968).
53 This familiar conclusion of the neoclassical deterrence literature ignores the
costs associated with investments in detection avoidance made by rule violators. That
is, the higher the ex post penalty for violating a rule is, the greater will be the rule
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should behave as if the probability of detection were equal to one and
the fine equaled the harm. This same analysis has been applied to
justify punitive damages in tort law and environmental law, among
many other areas.54 A similar analysis could be applied to tax law as
well. According to such an analysis, under certain restrictive
assumptions, the optimal fine for tax underpayments ought to be the
amount of tax underpayment divided by the probability of detection.
To see the operation of this idea in the tax context, take the
original Joe Taxpayer example but assume a probability of detection
of 1 %. In such a case, Joe's ex ante compliance incentive would be
optimized by applying a strict liability standard that assessed an
overall fine - including both the back-taxes and penalty - equal to
the harm (the additional taxes owed of $ 100) multiplied by 100 (i.e., 1
I 0.01). Thus, in the event the tax position was detected and rejected,
Joe would be required to pay not only the underpaid tax, but also a
punitive fine (or a kicker) of $9900.55 By adopting a rule that would
impose such a fine in the event of an adverse determination, the strict
liability-plus-punitive-kicker rule forces Joe, ex ante, to internalize the
expected tax liability associated with the transaction, which, as shown
above, leads to the optimal tax compliance incentives even under
conditions of legal uncertainty. (Again, this conclusion assumes Joe
has at least $10,000 worth of assets that might be subject to the ex post
penalty.) Recall that under the original example, Joe's optimal merits
probability threshold was 25 % . He should only make the investment if
he assessed the likelihood of winning on the merits to be greater than
25 % . Now, if the probability of detection were 1 % rather than 100 % ,

violator's investment in avoiding detection. See generally Arun S . Malik, Avoidance,
Screening, and Optimum Enforcement, 21 RAND J. ECON. 341 (1990). For a recent
summary of the literature on the problem of avoidance costs, see Chris William
Sanchirico, Detection Avoidance, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1331 (2006). How best to respond
to the problem of detection avoidance, and whether, for example, it makes sense to
punish avoidance activity as well as the underlying conduct, is a subject that I will
ignore for the purposes of this paper. Rather, I will assume that the optimal tradeoff
has been made between the size of the relevant penalty and the amount of any
punishment for detection avoidance. This will allow me to focus on the problem of
substantive legal uncertainty - the uncertainty as to how the substantive law will be
applied to the case at hand.
54 See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic
Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869 (1998).
55 Since the optimal total damage payment is determined by harm (h) divided by
the probability of detection (p), and the optimal punitive award is the amount in
excess of the actual harm, the multiplier that can be used to calculate the punitive
kicker part of the award can be written as: [(1- p) I p] * h. Id. at 890 n.51.
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but the potential total tax liability were $10,000 rather than just $100,
Joe would still have an incentive to make the investment (and claim
the $100 tax benefit) only if doing so were socially efficient - that is,
only if the 25 % merits probability were exceeded. In sum, a strict
liability rule with a Bentham-Becker punitive penalty can induce
optimal ex ante tax compliance incentives in a world with
substantively uncertain tax law and in which taxpayer aggressiveness
regularly goes undetected.
Applying the strict-liability-with-punitive-kicker regime, however,
raises a number of conceptual and practical problems. These are the
ex post unfairness concern, the judgment-proof taxpayer problem, the
over-deterrence problem, and the administrability problem. I discuss
the first three in this part and the fourth in Part VI. Some but not all
of these concerns will apply to both a strict liability and a fault-based
regime. All of them are connected with, and even attributable to, the
punitive-kicker aspect of the tax penalty regime proposed in the
previous section.
First, even if we assume that taxpayers are perfectly rational and
informed - and thus would be optimally deterred by a Bentham
Becker penalty - there is the view that the Bentham-Becker punitive
penalty would create a kind of ex post unfairness because of the
disparity between the size of the penalty and the magnitude of the
offense. In the criminal law context, this complaint against Bentham
Becker penalties is often stated in terms of the punishment being out
of proportion to the crime. Thus, for example, if an individual were to
break the law and cause a social harm of $100, a sanction of $10,000
on that single individual would, on this view, be considered excessive.
The same criticism could be made in the tax context. If a taxpayer
underpays her income by $100, and the particular mistake has only a
1 % chance of being detected, it seems intuitively unfair that the one
person out of 100 who gets caught will have to pay $10,000 while the
other ninety-nine go free. Such an outcome seems especially
problematic when the activity in question, from an ex ante
perspective, is not clearly illegal but is only of uncertain legality.
This injustice may be seen as further compounded by the fact that
the size of the tax penalties imposed on taxpayers may in many cases
reward dishonesty in the following sense: if the Service were to
concentrate its enforcement efforts on identifying those taxpayers
who are most likely to cheat on their taxes (a reasonable strategy), the
probability of detection for those taxpayers would increase relative to
the probability of detection of the taxpayers who are not so much the
focus of the Service's scrutiny. The irony of this approach, however, is
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that the punitive-kicker would correspondingly be lower for those
relatively dishonest taxpayers (the ones on whom the Service is
focusing) and higher for the more honest taxpayers (to whom the
Service gives less frequent or less intense scrutiny). Thus, if we loosely
equate audit rates with detection rates, taxpayers subject to only a 1 %
audit rate because of their historically high levels of compliance would
face a potential noncompliance penalty equal to 100 times their tax
understatements; whereas the taxpayers subject to a 50% audit rate
because of their historically low levels of compliance would face a
potential penalty of only two times their understatements. Of course,
audit rates are not necessarily inversely correlated with relative
honesty. For example, it may be administratively or politically more
feasible to audit certain taxpayers at higher rates than others. But the
perception of unfairness could still be a problem. 56
Besides the ex post unfairness problems, there is a potential
deterrence problem as well: a rational taxpayer of the sort I have been
assuming throughout this analysis (including an assumption of risk
neutrality) would ignore the threat of any ex post fine that exceeds the
amount of her assets that are available to satisfy a tax judgment. This
fact - sometimes called the judgment-proof problem - limits the
ability of large ex post fines to produce optimal ex ante compliance
incentives. The problem is well known in the deterrence literature,

56 One could argue that these ex post unfairness concerns are not present under
the assumptions of the examples above, specifically the assumption of perfectly
informed and rational taxpayers. That is, if taxpayers are perfectly informed of the
merits probability of a particular tax position, perfectly informed of the likelihood of
detection, and perfectly informed of the potential Bentham-Becker penalty they face,
then no unfairness arises when they freely choose to assume the risk of taking the tax
position in question. That is, under these assumptions, when a taxpayer's uncertain
position happens to be detected by the Service and happens to be rejected and the
penalty assessed, that would be an example of what Ronald Dworkin calls "option
luck." See Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL.
& PUB. AFF. 283, 293 {1981). And to allow the taxpayer to bear the consequences of
her bad option luck is, on this influential view of distributive j ustice, entirely
appropriate. See generally id. at 185. However, insofar as the taxpayer's decision to
engage in the uncertain tax position, and hence to subj ect herself to the risk of a large
tax penalty, is influenced by irrationality or incomplete information (and thus the risk
is in some sense not freely chosen), we might consider the result a form of bad "brute
luck," which Dworkin (and most every egalitarian theorist) would regard as an
appropriate grounds for redistributive intervention. Not everyone, not even every
philosopher, is prepared to fully embrace this distinction between option luck and
brute luck.
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and it suggests that even with a Bentham-Becker punitive penalty in
place, if taxpayers are judgment-proof, they will be under-deterred.57
Interestingly, there is also an over-deterrence concern with the
punitive-kicker penalty, although it requires that we assume risk
aversion on the part of the taxpayers. Putting aside the judgment
proof problem for the moment, the prospect of large tax penalties in
conj unction with a strict liability rule can actually over-deter, that is,
induce taxpayers to under-invest in legally uncertain tax positions.
The point is simple enough to understand: risk-averse taxpayers facing
a potentially large ex post tax penalty in the event their uncertain tax
positions end up losing in court might be deterred from taking such
positions in the first place - even when taking such positions,
although not certain to be upheld on the merits, is well above the
efficient merits probability threshold. That is, they would be deterred
from making investments that they should make. Thus, for example,
when the likelihood of succeeding on the merits for a particular
transaction is, say, 40% , we know that it would be efficient for the
taxpayer to make the investment if the optimal merits probability
threshold is less than 40% . (In the Joe Taxpayer example above,
recall, that threshold was 25 % .) If the taxpayer is risk-averse, the
possibility of a $ 10,000 ex post tax liability might dissuade the
taxpayer from going through with even a tax-efficient transaction, that
is, even though the expected tax liability would be significantly less
than the expected pre-tax profit. In that sense, then, if taxpayers are
risk-averse, a full punitive-kicker penalty can over-deter and
discourage efficient transactions.
Some readers may scoff at this over-deterrence concern. They
might say, for example, that while over-deterrence may be a
theoretical possibility, it is a miniscule concern in the real world of tax
enforcement. The much bigger problem, the argument goes, is under
deterrence. The whole problem of corporate tax shelters, for example,
which has occupied so many pages in Tax Notes, The Wall Street
Journal, and The New York Times in recent years, is in essence a
problem of under-deterrence. Moreover, the Treasury Department
continues to report a substantial federal tax gap of roughly 16% that is, federal tax revenues are estimated to be approximately 16%
less than they would be if all taxpayers paid what they actually owe.58
57 This problem is acknowledged in the standard works on the Bentham-Becker
approach to punitive sanctions. See, e.g. , Polinsky & Shavell, Punitive Damages, supra
note 54, at 932.
58 I.RS. News Release FS-2005-14 {Mar. 2005), available at http://www. irs.gov/
newsroom/article/ O,,id=137246,00.html (Understanding the Tax Gap).
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Thus, one might reasonably ask, how serious can the over-deterrence
problem really be? My own view, based on very little evidence, is that
at present the over-deterrence problem is probably small, though not
nonexistent. Even now, I have heard anecdotal accounts of taxpayers
who are not willing to engage in certain types of transactions that are
tax sensitive because the tax law is too uncertain, and because the
Service will not issue them a private letter ruling on the issue. I have
no idea how large this problem is. The much more important point is
that, even if it were the case that there is presently relatively little
over-deterrence under the current tax penalty regime, we obviously
do not currently have anything resembling a Bentham-Becker penalty
regime. As discussed above, maximum penalties are usually limited to
20% , rarely higher than 75 % , of the underpaid tax. These amounts
are obviously far, far less than the penalties that would be the norm
under a Bentham-Becker model, which again would be five, ten, or
even 100 times the tax underpayment. If such large penalties were
authorized, it is reasonable to suppose that it would not be very long
before complaints of over-deterrence would dominate the tax news
coverage.
VI. T HE POTENTIAL ROLE OF (AND THE PROBLEMS WITH) TAX
LIABILITY INSURANCE

Before we get to the administrability problems with the strict tax
liability punitive-kicker regime, consider a possible, at least partial,
solution to the ex post unfairness and over-deterrence concerns.
These concerns could be reduced if we allowed (and the j udgment
proof problem could be reduced if we required) taxpayers to purchase
insurance against the possibility that a particular tax position on their
return might be rejected by the Service and back-taxes and fines
imposed. The insurance would cover the back-taxes, interest,
penalties, and perhaps the legal fees as well.59 What would the effect
of such insurance be? In theory, assuming actuarially priced insurance,
such an innovation would convert the large ex post fines that would
threaten taxpayers under the Bentham-Becker kicker regime into

59 Such insurance is not merely a theoretical possibility. There is in fact a small
but growing market for this insurance. See Kyle D. Logue, Tax Law Uncertainty and
the Role of Tax Insurance, 25 VA. TAX REV. 339 (2005), for a description of this type
of insurance and the deterrence concerns it can raise. An alternative to commercially
provided tax liability insurance would be government provided tax insurance. Private
letter rulings can be seen as a form of government provided insurance against
substantive uncertainty in the tax law.
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something approximating the taxpayer's ex ante expected tax liability.
This theoretical result would be as close to the ideal tax treatment of
legally uncertain tax transactions as we can get, both from a
deterrence perspective and a distributive justice perspective. To see
this point, go back to the original example where the efficient merits
probability threshold was 25 % , owing to the $75 expected pre-tax
profit and $100/$0 potential tax liability. Additionally, assume again
that the detection probability for the transaction is 1 % , such that the
optimal punitive penalty is $9900, plus the $100 tax liability. Now
imagine that Joe Taxpayer finds a particular transaction that fits this
profile and that has a merits probability of 40% . Joe's expected tax
liability is thus $60.(,() Because his expected after-tax profit is $15, he
should clearly make the investment. For the critical point, assume
further that there are 99,999 other taxpayers in the economy taking a
tax position with the same payoff structure as Joe's, an expected tax
liability of $60. Assume also that all of these tax positions are
uncorrelated with one another, in the sense that when one uncertain
position is resolved by the Service or a court ex post, that decision has
no effect on how the other cases will be resolved. According to these
assumptions, only 1000 of these taxpayers will be audited, 600 of
whom will lose their cases and be required to pay the $100 in taxes
plus the $9900 Bentham-Becker punitive fine. Again, such a rule
produces the right ex ante incentives. The problem, according to the
ex post unfairness complaint, is that 600 unlucky souls are required to
pay $10,000 each, while the other 99,400 taxpayers, who are in exactly
the same position and who took exactly the same risk, pay nothing.
That result could be seen as distributively unjust.
Tax liability insurance can alleviate this injustice. Since each of
the 100,000 taxpayers in this example has an expected tax liability of
$60 - each is taking a 0.006 chance of paying a $10,000 tax-plus
penalty liability - tax liability insurance, in its idealized form, would
allow these taxpayers to shift the risk of a $10,000 payment to the
insurer in exchange for paying the insurer a premium of roughly $60.
If such insurance were provided, when the 1000 out of the 100,000
taxpayers were selected for audit, and 600 of those ended up losing
their cases, the insurer would pay the $10,000 total tax liability for
each of the 600 unlucky ones.61 In so doing, the insurer would be
acting in effect as a private ex ante tax collector, collecting premiums

(0.4 * 0) + (0.6 * $100) $60.
The insurer could also cover the litigation costs of all 1000 selected for audit
but we can assume that away for now.
60

61

=
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of $60 from each of the taxpayers in the pool in advance and then
eventually paying those premiums over to the government (less an
administrative fee) .
Ideally, this type of tax insurance could reduce the over
deterrence problem as well as the ex post unfairness (or perceived
unfairness) associated with the Bentham-Becker punitive sanction.
The over-deterrence problem goes away because the threat of a large
ex post fine goes away. The ex post unfairness concern is addressed
through the operation of insurance risk pooling. So, unlike the
Bentham-Becker penalty without insurance, where $6,000,000 was
spread across 600 taxpayers, here $6,000,000 is spread equally among
1 00,000 taxpayers. Moreover, if we assume that the insurer could set
and adjust premiums perfectly to correlate with the expected tax
liabilities of its insured (this is what I meant above by the assumption
of actuarially fair insurance), the strict liability rule with a Bentham
Becker penalty would still produce optimal ex ante compliance.
Because taxpayers would still ex ante face the expected tax liability
associated with the investment, they would be induced to make the
efficient decision regarding when to invest in reliance on uncertain tax
law.
This rosy picture ignores many complications that might make
such tax liability insurance infeasible. One problem is more
fundamental than the others: to the extent the tax insurer is not able
to classify risks perfectly, there would be a degree of both ex post
unfairness and inefficiency. Imagine that the insurer in the example
above could not distinguish between a taxpayer who is engaging in a
transaction with an expected tax liability of $60 and a taxpayer who is
making an investment with an expected tax liability of $70 or $50. To
the insurer, these all look the same. If that were true, there would be
inefficiency, because taxpayers would not face their own expected tax
liability. Some taxpayers who are insured would thus be induced to
make investments that are excessively aggressive. For example, a
taxpayer might represent to an insurer that it was going to engage in a
transaction with an expected tax liability of $60 and then tum around
and, in fact, engage in a transaction with an expected tax liability of
$70. This is a version of the well-known problem of moral hazard that
plagues all insurance arrangements to some extent. Likewise, those
taxpayers who expected to be engaging in relatively tax-risky
transactions (the $70 expected value transactions) would find the $60
premium to be a bargain and would be disproportionately likely to
purchase insurance. This would force premiums up over time, causing
the lower-risk taxpayers on the margin to opt out of buying insurance,
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thus leaving them uninsured and, again, potentially over-deterred.
This is of course the tax-insurance version of adverse selection. When
there is variance within insurance risk pools, there is concomitantly
cross-subsidization from the low risk to the high risk insured, which
arguably presents an ex ante unfairness concern.
Moral hazard, adverse selection, and cross-subsidization occur to
some extent in all insurance markets and are not considered per se
fatal to the enterprise. Insurers generally try to combat these
problems in a myriad of ways, not the least of which is by engaging in
ex ante efforts at risk classification and contractual protection. For
example, a tax-risk insurer who is approached about covering a
particular tax transaction might hire its own tax experts to evaluate
the legal merits of the proposed tax treatment. This would help the
insurer to decide whether to offer the coverage, at what price, and
under what terms. To mitigate the problem of moral hazard - that is,
the taxpayer who says she is planning a transaction with a $60 tax risk
but then proceeds to do a transaction with a risk of $70 - the insurer
could, in advance of the transaction, require the taxpayer to provide
detailed representations regarding the proposed transaction (details
suggested by the insurer's tax experts), and the breach of these
representations by the taxpayer would be grounds for the insurer to
void the contract. Plus, insurers could use a combination of large
deductibles and contractual policy exclusions to try to reduce moral
hazard and adverse selection concerns. 62 Insurers have used these
tools for decades in liability and other insurance markets and,
interestingly, they are beginning to use them now in the small but
growing tax-risk insurance market.63
Another serious problem with tax-risk insurance, which
potentially confronts all premium-financed insurance arrangements, is
the possibility of correlated risks. In the example above, I assumed
that all 100,000 taxpayers were engaging in transactions that posed the
same tax risk but that were uncorrelated with each other. Those are
the perfect conditions for the insurance risk-spreading mechanism to
work. I have already discussed what happens when the risks being
insured have different expected values - the problem of insufficiently
precise risk classification. But what happens if the tax risks are
correlated? If the insurer has not reinsured the risk, and if the
correlated risks represent a large fraction of the insurer's overall book
62

This in fact happens with tax transaction liability insurance. See Logue, supra
note 59, at 388.
63 See id.
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of business, the result can be bankruptcy for the insurer. To see this,
change the example so that all of the 100,000 taxpayers are doing
precisely the same transaction, or they are doing transactions that turn
on exactly the same uncertain legal question, such that if the legal
uncertainty is resolved in one case, it gets resolved in all of them,
virtually simultaneously. In that case, if those taxpayers' risks were the
only risks that the insurer covered, and the insurer had no reinsurance
and no large surplus of assets, it would not be able to price the
policies. The insurer could not charge just $60 for the policies, because
if a court were to decide against one of the taxpayers, there would not
be sufficient funds to cover all of the claims. The insurer would have
$6 million in premiums, but would need $100 million, since all 1000
taxpayers selected for audit would lose their cases. In addition, the
insurer would not be able to charge much more than $60 because the
taxpayer-insureds would not be willing to pay more. Certainly
taxpayers would not be willing to pay a premium of $100 (equal to the
taxes they hoped to avoid paying on the transaction), which would be
necessary to give the insurer certainty that it would be able to pay the
claims when they come in.64
This correlated-risk problem is potentially troubling, given that
some uncertain tax issues are correlated with each other. This is
especially true insofar as taxpayers tend to copy each other's tax
transactions. However, the correlated-risk problem seems ultimately
unlikely to prevent a tax-risk insurance market from arising if a
Bentham-Becker punitive-kicker tax penalty regime were adopted.
Why? First, there are many different sources of transactional tax law
uncertainty, almost as many as there are sections in the Code. Second,
there would rarely be perfect correlation of risks, even when
taxpayers attempt to engage in very similar transactions. Often the tax
treatment will turn on highly fact-specific issues that will be peculiar
to the particular transaction and particular taxpayer. For that reason,
it would be surprising if an insurer could not put together a portfolio
of tax law risks that were relatively diversified or uncorrelated with
each other. Moreover, insurers can, and usually do, reinsure their risks
with other, larger insurers that have larger and more diversified
portfolios. For the very large insurers, since their tax insurance
business would be only a small part of their own portfolio, this
diversification function would be performed largely in house.

64 This is an example of the much more general insurance problem of correlated
risks, which can make insurance markets fail.
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One complaint that gets lodged against allowing tax-risk
insurance in the current regulatory climate is that the availability of
tax insurance will exacerbate an already existing under-deterrence
problem.65 The argument is that, given the trivial penalties that
currently exist for tax noncompliance, the existence of tax law
uncertainty and taxpayer risk aversion are necessary to prevent the
tax gap from increasing dramatically. Or, if risk-averse taxpayers are
allowed to insure their penalties, competitive market forces will
eventually motivate insurers to offer coverage for transactions that
have zero merits probability, in which the only risk they would be
insuring would be the risk of detection. Put differently, the worst case
scenario with respect to tax-risk insurance would be insurance for
clearly illegal transactions. I agree that this is a concern under the
existing penalty structure, and in another article I have suggested
some possible solutions, such as requiring taxpayers who purchase
tax-risk insurance to report this fact to the Service, thus raising the
detection risk, and hence the expected tax liability, for such
transactions significantly.66 This problem of tax shelter insurance,
however, would not likely arise - or would be much diminished under a strict liability penalty regime with a Bentham-Becker punitive
penalty. If the penalty is set properly, the insurance premium for the
transaction will equal the expected tax liability. In other words, for a
transaction with a merits probability of zero, the insurance premium
would equal the potential tax liability, making the deal not worth
doing for the taxpayer.67 Thus, if in our example the merits probability
were zero, the insurer would charge the taxpayer a premium of $100,
efficiently deterring the transaction.
An alternative to allowing risk-averse taxpayers to purchase tax
liability insurance from commercial insurance companies would be to
allow them to purchase such insurance directly from the government.
That is, each of the taxpayers in the example above could pay the U.S.
Treasury, instead of an insurance company, $60 and in exchange
receive a commitment that the issue in question would not be
challenged. This approach seems similar to a private letter ruling, but
one where taxpayers are required to pay the expected tax liability in
advance. Perhaps the better analogy would be to a settlement
agreement between a taxpayer and the Service on some issue that the
65

See Logue, supra note 59, at 398.
Id. at 347.
67 More generally, the liability insurance premium for a clearly illegal activity in
a world in which accurately calculated Bentham-Becker penalties are imposed would
equal the harm in question.
66
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Service has challenged but with respect to which the legal outcome is
uncertain. Interestingly, under either approach to dealing with tax law
uncertainty - the private insurance approach and the government
insurance (or settlement) approach - the key facts are that the
taxpayers would face approximately their expected tax liability when
making tax-sensitive investment decisions, the government would get
the right amount of revenue under the circumstance ($6 million in our
example involving 1 00,000 taxpayers), and the tax burden for these
types of transactions would be allocated fairly across all taxpayers
doing the deal ($60 each). Whether government insurance or private
insurance would be the better mechanism for this is beyond the scope
of this article. The essential point to recognize here would be that,
under present assumptions, including the assumption of a strict
liability rule with an ex post Bentham-Becker fine, either would
optimize ex ante compliance and tax decision-making under
conditions of uncertainty.
The most serious difficulty with any attempt to adopt a full
fledged punitive-kicker tax penalty regime on the Bentham-Becker
model is not the ex post injustice or the over-deterrence problems or
the problems of imperfect insurance markets. Rather, the most
troubling concern is the administrability of the penalty provision itself.
In the analysis thus far, it has been assumed that the ex post
adjudicator, the Service or the court, would be able to determine with
perfect accuracy not only the correct answer to the tax question at
issue but also, for the purpose of calculating the penalty, the particular
ex ante probability of detection for the particular taxpayer and tax
issue under scrutiny. Such an assessment is obviously necessary to
calculate the precisely correct cost-internalizing penalty. But making
such an assessment, at least with any degree of precision, would be
impossible. That impossibility may well be why the current tax penalty
regime falls so far short of the Bentham-Becker ideal, with most
penalties capped at 20% of the underpaid tax, Indeed, some
commentators have cited this problem as a reason not even to attempt
an ex post punitive penalty approach to dealing with the low
probability-of-protection problem.68 Moreover, this problem is
connected specifically to the punitive-kicker penalty and therefore
would apply whether the tax liability rule in place were strict liability

68 See, e.g. , Alex Raskolnikov, Crime and Punishment in Taxation: Deceit,
Deterrence, and the Self-Adjusting Penalty, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 569 (2006) (pointing
out the difficulty of such an ex post assessment of the ex ante probability of
detection).
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(as I have been discussing thus far) or fault-based (to be taken up
below) .
I agree that neither the Service nor any court evaluating the
merits of a particular tax position would be able precisely to calculate
the ex ante probability that such a position would be detected. Still,
some rough approximation might be possible. For example, the ex
post adj udicator, whoever it might be, could begin by relying on the
publicly available audit rates for various classes of taxpayers.69 Such
audit rates would almost certainly overstate the probability of
detection for many sorts of tax issues that involve substantial legal
uncertainty, given that many such issues avoid detection even on
audit. However, a penalty based on audit rates would come much
closer to the Bentham-Becker ideal than the current regime. Further,
as a means of increasing the accuracy of the penalty for the taxpayer
in question, the adjudicator might be allowed access to the Service's
confidential information regarding audit strategies and audit
probabilities. For still further refinement, the adjudicator could then
consider evidence specific to the individual or corporation before it.
Moreover, if we are worried about giving this much enforcement
discretion to the Service or to the courts - that is, the discretion to
determine the size of the ex post tax penalty based on all of these
factors - Congress could enact a schedule of punitive fines that
would be based on audit rates and that could be somewhat tailored to
the class of transaction at issue.
By offering these responses to the administrability problem, I do
not mean to suggest that this concern should be overlooked or taken
lightly. In my view, it is very likely that this concern may be sufficient
reason not to adopt such a regime. However, the question is at least
worth further study and should get more attention in the literature
than it has received.
To summarize the analysis thus far, under the assumptions laid
out in Part III above, when the law is substantively uncertain - in the
sense that there is a positive, but less than one, probability of success
on the merits of the tax position at issue - the optimal tax penalty
regime would involve a strict liability rule. Indeed, under present
assumptions, a strict liability rule works when the substantive law is
certain as well. The optimal level of penalty, however, depends on the
probability of detection. If detection is certain, there is no need for a
penalty in excess of the taxes owed plus interest. If detection is
uncertain, as it always will be in the cases of interest to the present
69

See supra note 47.
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analysis (ones that involve substantive legal uncertainty), the penalty
should approximate the back-taxes owed plus interest divided by the
probability of detection. That is the famous Bentham-Becker kicker.
Such a regime would induce the taxpayer to make optimal decisions
regarding whether and under what circumstances to rely on uncertain
tax law. One conclusion made clear by my analysis is that there is no a
priori appropriate or efficient merits probability threshold or
minimum. Rather, how certain the taxpayer ought to be about the
substantive law before relying on it will depend on a number of
factors, including the size of the potential tax consequences and the
potential pre-tax profit expected from the investment. If we are
concerned about the potential unfairness and over-deterrence effects
of very large potential tax penalties - which could be in the
neighborhood of five, ten, or even 100 times the underpaid tax - then
tax penalty insurance could be offered by private insurers or the
government. Indeed, if a Bentham-Becker penalty regime were
enacted, such an insurance market would likely arise on its own unless
prohibited by law and whether and how to regulate that market would
be the resulting questions.
The preceding analysis looked exclusively at a strict liability
approach to tax penalties. Under such a regime, when a taxpayer is
singled out for enforcement and has a tax position rejected by the
adjudicator, not only is she held strictly liable for any additional tax
she is found to owe, but she is also automatically liable for the
underpayment penalties as well, penalties that ideally (ignoring all of
the caveats discussed above) would be set according to the Bentham
Becker formula. The other option of course involves some form of
fault-based or negligence standard for assessing penalties. Indeed, the
fault-based alternative is deserving of special attention, given that the
current tax penalty regime employs a fault-based approach. The
obvious questions are whether the fault-based approach could, like
the strict liability approach, create optimal ex ante tax compliance
incentives, and, if so, which regime could do so at lower cost.
Relatedly, does the fault-based approach face drawbacks similar to
those discussed above. In the next part, I explain two fundamental
problems with using a fault-based standard for tax penalties, at least if
the standard of fault is tied to the question of whether the taxpayer
satisfied the optimal merits probability threshold. Then I explain why,
notwithstanding these problems, there is a second-best argument for
adopting, or (more accurately) continuing to use, some form of fault
based approach to tax penalties.
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ASSESSING A FAULT-B ASED TAX PENALTY REGIME

A. Defining the Fault-Based Standard: Applying the Optimal Merits
Probability Threshold

If a taxpayer takes a position on her tax return that relies on a
substantively uncertain interpretation of the tax laws, and the Service
and the courts decide that the taxpayer happens to be wrong, then, as
to the assessment of the underpaid taxes plus interest, the rule almost
by definition has to be strict liability. That is, if the ex post adjudicator
determines that a taxpayer owes more taxes than she paid (recall that
we are assuming that the Service and courts resolve this uncertainty
definitively ex post), then that assessment is final. The taxes must be
paid. Joe Taxpayer cannot get out of paying his taxes simply because
the law, ex ante, was uncertain, even if his interpretation of the law
was reasonable.70 At bottom, the tax law is distributive in nature, and
the adjudicator is resolving the uncertainty as to what the distributive
burden of the tax laws ought to be.11 The interesting question involves
the penalty, the amount imposed on the taxpayer over and above the
underpaid tax liability. The analysis to this point has been focusing
exclusively on the possibility of imposing such penalties on the basis of
strict liability, which is a term and concept borrowed from tort law.
The obvious alternative to a strict liability approach to tax penalties is
a fault-based approach.
What would an idealized fault-based tax penalty regime under
conditions of substantive legal uncertainty look like? At the most
10

Again, this conclusion assumes there are no "do overs" or " unwindings" of tax
transactions. For a discussion of the concept of unwindings, see D avid Hasen,
Unwinding Unwinding (Univ. of Mich. Law Sch., Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working
Paper Series, W orking Paper No. 87, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=999411. I f we allowed unwindings, once a taxpayer made an investment in
reliance on uncertain tax law and that uncertainty is eventually resolved by the
Service or a court against the taxpayer (i.e., the court says the taxpayer's position is
wrong and he owes more taxes), the taxpayer would be permitted to say " never
mind . . . I didn't want to do the deal in the first place" and the whole transaction
would be reversed. Of course, such a result would require the acquiescence of the
other party to the transaction.
71
In that sense, a court's interpretation of the tax laws is akin to a court's
interpretation of a contract between two parties: if the court interprets the contract to
mean that X owes Y another $100, then X owes Y this amount. There is no reasonable
interpretation exception to one's contract obligations. This conclusion does not deny,
of course, that there can be settlements in which parties to uncertain contracts will
compromise and split the difference, just as there can be settlements between the
Service and taxpayers when the law is uncertain.
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general level, a fault-based tax penalty regime can be described as
follows: if the Service and the court determine that a taxpayer has, in
effect, caused "harm" by taking a tax position that turns out to have
been wrong, then whether or not the taxpayer will be required to pay
a penalty (in addition to the back-taxes plus interest that is by
assumption owed) will depend on whether the taxpayer's position was
in some sense "reasonable."72 What constitutes a "reasonable" tax
position under conditions of substantive tax law uncertainty is the
interesting question. As it turns out, it is also a surprisingly difficult
question to answer, even as a conceptual matter. That is to say,
although it is simple enough to apply the torts concept of strict
liability in the tax context (since strict liability is pretty much the same
across all contexts - that is, the offending (or injuring) party is forced
to pay the harm she causes plus some additional penalty in cases of
detection uncertainty), the same cannot be said of the negligence
standard.
There is in fact a negligence penalty in the income tax.73 And the
definition of negligence in tax law owes an obvious debt to tort law.
The negligence penalty in tax is imposed for any tax underpayment
resulting from the taxpayer's lack of "due care" or failure to do what
"an ordinarily prudent person would do under the circumstances."74
The precise meaning of due care in this context is not clear. Of course,
the same can be said of the due care standard in tort law, where the
issue of what constitutes a failure of ordinary prudence will typically
be determined after the fact by a judge or jury applying an ad hoc
analysis that takes into account all of the relevant facts and
circumstances. Some conceptual clarity has been brought to the due
care standard in torts, with the famous Learned Hand cost-benefit
test, but even that seemingly straightforward analysis presents
conceptual difficulties. The Learned Hand rule, announced in United
States v. Carroll Towing, says that tort defendants will be found to
have been negligent - that is, found to have violated the "due care"
standard - if it can be shown that they failed to take precautions that
would have reduced expected accident costs by more than the cost of

72
73
74

I.RC.§ 6662(c).
See I.RC. § 6662(b)(l ).
Neely v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 934, 947 (1985). The negligence penalty is
separate from the substantial understatement penalty. That is, one can take an
uncertain tax position that turns out to be wrong but is reasonable (non-negligent),
thus avoiding the negligence penalty, but still have to pay the substantial
understatement penalty.
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the additional precaution.75 Under Hand's formulation, a party is
negligent if the burden of avoiding the accident (B) was less than the
product of the probability of the accident (P) and the potential
liability resulting from the harm (L) and the party failed to undertake
B.76 Although the Learned Hand standard has been influential among
courts and commentators on tort law, it has also generated
considerable controversy. For example, some argue that the
information that the Learned Hand standard requires is not available
to the factfinders who are asked to do the analysis. I will make a
similar argument about applying a Learned Hand type standard in the
tax penalty context.
Before we get to that criticism, however, what would such a test
even look like in the tax context? One possible approach to a Learned
Hand type test for penalties - though, as discussed more fully below,
not the approach used in the Code - would be to apply a version of
the optimal merits probability threshold developed in previous parts
of this article. To see how this would work, imagine that the taxpayer
has taken a particular tax position on her return, the position has been
scrutinized by the Service, and the position has been found wanting;
the Service and the court have determined that the taxpayer is not in
fact entitled to the deduction or credit she claimed, or must include
some item of income that she excluded, and thus that back-taxes and
interest are owed. The Service or the court would then ask whether
the particular tax position in question, at the time the return was filed,
had a probability of success on the merits that exceeded the optimal
merits probability threshold for that particular position, taking into
account the expected pre-tax profit and the potential tax
consequences for that particular transaction. If so, the taxpayer's
position would be considered reasonable, or non-negligent, and no
penalties would be assessed. If, however, the ex post adjudicator
determined that the tax position in question was ex ante below the
optimal merits probability threshold for that transaction, the taxpayer
would be required to pay the penalty. In other words, the taxpayer
would in that case have taken an unreasonable tax position.77
75

United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (1947).
Id. at 173.
77 This is, of course, not the only possible definition of taxpayer due care. For
example, due care might mean that the taxpayer has taken reasonable steps to figure
out what the law means. On this view, reliance on an expert's advice might be
sufficient to avoid penalties but the question would remain whether to impose some
minimal threshold of probability of success on the merits. That is, surely reliance on
legal advice would not excuse a clearly illegal position. Moreover, allowing reliance
76
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To get a sense of how this probabilistic fault-based standard might
be applied, return to the Joe Taxpayer example, with $75 expected
pre-tax profit, a potential tax liability of either $0 or $1 00, and a
detection probability of 0.01. For this transaction, the optimal merits
probability threshold is 25% . That is, it is socially cost-justified for Joe
to make the investment if the likelihood of success on the merits is
equal to or greater than 25%, but not otherwise. Now imagine that
Joe, after doing the requisite legal research (or having his lawyer do
it), learns that the particular transaction has a 40% chance of
prevailing if detected and he makes the investment. He happens to get
selected for audit, however, and ultimately loses the case; the court
says Joe owes another $1 00 of tax, which he does (as we are assuming
that the courts are never wrong). Does he owe a penalty as well? Not
according to the fault standard. Joe made a reasonable - by which I
mean, socially cost-justified - estimation of the law under the
circumstances and would have made the same choice if detection had
been certain and the penalty equal to the harm. Therefore, under this
theoretical tax penalty standard, Joe would owe no penalty. If,
however, the probability of success on the merits for the transaction
had been, say, 22%, when Joe made his investment, got caught, and
lost his case, he would have been required to pay the punitive penalty
as well - the additional $9900. Deterrence theory tells us that the
punitive penalty should be calculated according to the Bentham
Becker formula, even for a fault-based regime. With such a
probabilistic fault-based penalty in place, taxpayers would, under
current assumptions, be deterred from taking unreasonably aggressive
tax positions under circumstances in which the law is uncertain. This
result is analogous to the conclusion reached in the economic analysis
of the negligence rule in torts.78

on expert advice to avoid the negligence penalty would just push the penalty question
back one step: what should the standard of care be for the expert in advising a client
to take a particular position.
78 According to that analysis, assuming a world similar to the one I have been
assuming in this article (i.e., perfectly rational actors, no judicial errors, etc.), a
negligence standard set at the efficient level of care (that is, the so-called "due care"
standard) would induce potential tortfeasors ex ante to take all reasonable (i.e., cost
justified) steps to minimize the incidence and severity of accidents. The seminal
article explaining how a negligence standard in tort can induce optimal levels of
"care" is John Prather Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J. LEGAL
STUD. 323 (1973). See also WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 54-84 (1987); SHAVELL, supra note 36, at 73104.
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B. The Problems with a Probabilistic Fault-Based Tax Penalty Regime

Some of the problems with a probabilistic fault-based tax penalty
regime are similar to the problems with a fault-based tort regime
while some are unique to the tax context. This section discusses the
latter type. Part VII.C below, however, resurrects the case for a
modified version of the fault-based standard.
So what's wrong with the above described idealized form of a
fault-based tax penalty regime? The most obvious concern, and
ultimately perhaps the most troubling, is the problem of
administrability. How is the Service or a court, looking at a tax
position that it has decided lacks merit, supposed to determine the ex
ante optimal merits probability threshold for that particular
transaction?79 We have thus far assumed that courts get everything
exactly right when they resolve the tax law uncertainty ex post, but to
expect a court to do this analysis seems excessively optimistic.
Further, the problem seems more challenging than the problem
(discussed earlier) of determining the ex ante probability of detection
for the purpose of calculating the appropriate punitive penalty, which
again would be required under both the strict liability and fault-based
approaches. In assessing ex ante probabilities of detection, at least the
court can rely initially on concrete information that is in the hands of
the government, such as audit rates, as a starting point for the analysis.
With the probabilistic fault analysis, however, the ex post adjudicator
must determine the optimal merits probability threshold for this tax
transaction, or, more precisely, that probability at the time the
transaction was entered into. This means figuring out the expected
pre-tax profit from the deal and the potential tax consequences, as
well as making an ex post assessment of the ex ante likelihood that the
taxpayer would ultimately succeed on the merits. As difficult as this
last element of the fault-standard sounds (determining the ex ante
probability of success on the merits), the Service and courts today are
in fact asked to do this analysis when applying the various
understatement penalties under existing law. In cases in which a
taxpayer's reporting position is challenged and ultimately overturned
by a court, the penalty phase of the analysis requires the court to
make an ex post guess of the ex ante strength or weakness of the

79 Such information
cost objections to fault-based liability regimes are
commonplace in the economic literature on deterrence. See, e.g. , LANDES & POSNER,
supra note 78; POLINSKY, supra note 36; SHA YELL, supra note 36.
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taxpayer's legal position (literally cast in terms of probability of
success on the merits).80
Even if a fault-based approach to tax penalties could be made
administrable (a topic I will discuss below), this approach still may not
be superior to the strict liability tax penalty regime, at least if we
continue with the present assumptions. Both types of penalty regimes,
by assumption, would entail the ex post analysis of the probability of
detection, in order to set the proper Bentham-Becker penalty.
However, only the fault-based approach would also require a second
costly application of the appropriate merits probability threshold. One
possible response to this observation is that, if we return to the
standard deterrence assumptions (perfect rationality, no judicial error,
etc.), a fault-based approach might be superior because, for game
theoretic reasons, the penalty would never actually have to be
imposed. Given the potential liability that the taxpayers face, and the
all-or-nothing nature of the fault standard (that is, if you satisfy it, you
avoid all of the penalty - all $10,000 in our example), taxpayers
would have an incentive to be at least efficiently conservative, in the
sense of only making investments with merits probabilities greater
than the efficient threshold that the Service would apply to their
conduct. As a result, again for game-theoretic reasons, all taxpayers
would have an incentive to satisfy the fault standard and hence in
theory there would be no need for the penalty to be imposed. To put
this point differently, under a fault-based tax penalty regime,
taxpayers who are taking advantage of uncertain tax rules can, in
effect, insure themselves against the risk of a large tax penalty (should
the uncertainty be resolved against them) by taking only reasonable
tax positions - only positions that fall within the relevant merits
probability threshold. Assuming that courts never make mistakes in
their ex post penalty assessments, and taxpayers never make mistakes
in calculating the relevant ex ante merits probability threshold, the
decision to take only reasonable tax positions would be (almost)
equivalent to the purchase of tax-risk insurance. The result is an
increase in social welfare, as risk-averse taxpayers would bear less
risk.8 1 Interestingly, in the general economic deterrence literature, this
80

Those penalties, again, are usually 20% of the underpaid tax, and sometimes,
though rarely, as high as 75 % . See supra note 22 (discussing existing tax penalty
regime).
81 Of course, once we allow the possibility of legal errors on the part of the
taxpayer or the courts, risk-bearing and the demand for insurance returns. Below I
explain why the reasonable-tax-position safe harbor is importantly different from the
purchase tax liability insurance.
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observation - the fault-based system's ability to reduce risk-bearing
because the sanction is never . used - is cited as an independent
reason, though not necessarily an overwhelming reason, to prefer the
fault-based approach over the strict liability approach.82
Beyond the administrative cost arguments already discussed,
there are two fundamental problems with the use of a fault-based tax
penalty standard. The first - the activity-level problem - is well
known in the deterrence literature and applies to the use of a fault
based standard in any context.83 The second - which for lack of a
better term I will call the distributional problem - has not previously
been discussed and applies only to the use of a fault-based standard in
the context of tax penalties.
The activity-level problem is straightforward: to the extent that
taxpayers comply with the fault standard, and again assuming courts
always reach the right result, taxpayers can be sure that they will not
face a tax penalty. This fact, as mentioned above, reduces the risk that
they bear. It also means, however, that they are not forced to
internalize the cost of those tax positions that happen to turn out to be
wrong - wrong but reasonable. As a result, they will have an
incentive to engage in the activity beyond the point at which it is
socially cost-justified for them to do so. We can see this point in the
example from above. The taxpayer is considering a transaction with
an expected pre-tax profit of $75 and a 60% chance of causing a $100
tax liability. Under a strict liability approach, she would face an
expected tax liability of $60, either because of the expected ex post
fine or because of the ex ante insurance premium. Therefore, the
taxpayer would make the investment so long as the $15 profit from
the deal would be superior to whatever after-tax profit she could get
from some alternative use of the investment, but not otherwise. With
the fault-based approach however, assuming the merits probability is
at least greater than 25 % , the taxpayer's expected after-tax profit
from making the investment would be $75. Thus, she would engage in
the transaction so long as there were no other similar investment that
produced more than a $75 after-tax profit. In sum, the taxpayer would
be induced to engage in the questionable transaction even when it is
not socially cost-justified. (For example, she would invest in this
transaction even if there were another transaction with an expected
after-tax profit of, say, $70.) More generally, with a fault-based tax
penalty regime, there would be an incentive to over-invest or invest
82
83

Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 37, at 311.
See SHAVELL, supra note 36, at 23-24.
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too often in legally uncertain tax transactions. This problem does not
exist with strict liability, where the taxpayers are forced to internalize
the expected tax liability associated with their investments. The
relative superiority of strict liability over fault-based standards in
dealing with activity-level issues on the part of "potential injurers" is
well established in the deterrence literature, and the same arguments
would seem to apply in virtually any deterrence context.84
The distributional problem with a fault-based tax penalty seems
to apply uniquely, or at least especially, to the tax context. (As far as I
know, this problem has never been noticed before.) The problem
arises insofar as the fault-based penalty eliminates or reduces the
actual imposition of the tax penalties. Recall the observation above
that, under ideal circumstances, taxpayers are induced to satisfy
whatever threshold of reasonableness is set for them by the courts
such that no penalties are assessed. Again, in non-tax areas, this fact is
cited as one of the advantages of a fault-based standard because it
means there is no risk-bearing. The difficulty is that, in the tax area,
there is a distributional reason that we want the penalties to be
imposed. The failure to impose the penalties actually reduces social
welfare, for distributional reasons, not deterrence reasons.
The best way to illustrate this point is by example. Consider our
recurring hypothetical, the one with the 100,000 taxpayers all engaging
in a tax transaction with a 60% chance of producing a $100 tax
liability, and hence the expected tax liability of $60 per taxpayer.
84 See id. at 23-25. A classic example in the torts context illustrating the
distinction between care levels and activity levels, and how these variables come out
differently under negligence and strict liability, involves driver-pedestrian accidents.
Under both a strict liability rule and an idealized negligence rule, drivers will have an
incentive to take optimal care when they drive. Under a negligence rule, however,
drivers will drive too often (or beyond the point at which the next mile driven
produces marginal social cost in excess of marginal social benefit), because they will
be immune from liability for "unpreventable" accidents. Under a strict liability rule,
by contrast, drivers would bear the cost of unpreventable accidents and thus would be
induced to take into account those costs when deciding how often or how much to
drive. POLINSKY, supra note 36, at 44-49. If we assume further that only drivers (and
not pedestrians) can affect the probability or severity of accidents (that is, we assume
driver-pedestrian accidents are "unilateral accidents") , then the above analysis
suggests that strict liability would be the more efficient liability rule, because it can
optimize both care levels and activity levels of potential injurers. If we assume,
however, that pedestrians can affect the expected accident costs as well, through care
level investments or changes in their activity levels, then the story gets more
complicated. I am assuming for now that the choice of a tax liability rule can only
affect the behavior of taxpayers (the potential injurers here) and not Congress or the
Treasury Department (acting on behalf of the "injured" fisc).
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Hence, the transaction has 40% chance of winning on the merits.
Under the fault-based standar.d described above, all of the 100,000
taxpayers would have engaged in this hypothetical transaction
because the 40% chance of prevailing on the merits would be deemed
a "reasonable" position by a court. This is because the 40%
probability surpasses the optimal merits probability threshold for this
transaction (which, recall, was 25% ). According to the assumptions of
the example, then, 1000 of those taxpayers would be audited and 600
of those would lose their cases on the merits. For those 600 taxpayers,
the fault-based penalty analysis would be applied and the court would
inquire as to the reasonableness of the position taken. As noted, the
answer would be that the position was reasonable. Thus, none of
taxpayers would be assessed a penalty, and the total amount of tax
revenue collected from these taxpayers for this transaction would be
$60,000 - $100 of taxes multiplied by 600, the number of taxpayers
who were audited and lost their cases. So what's wrong with this
scenario?
The problem is that, in terms of probabilistic distributive justice,
$60,000 is approximately $5.94 million too little to be taxing this group
of 100,000 taxpayers who are engaging in a series of transactions that
almost certainly are collectively producing an income tax liability of
$6 million. That is to say, if it were feasible and cost-justified to audit
all 100,000 taxpayers who engaged in this transaction, approximately
60,000 of the taxpayers would be found to owe $100, and the other
40,000 taxpayers, nothing. That is what we meant above when we
assumed that the 100,000 transactions in question had a 40% chance
of prevailing on the merits. Of course, auditing all 100,000 taxpayers is
by assumption not feasible. The question therefore is: what can the tax
system do, in terms of allocating the tax burden consistently with
society's distributional values or preferences? The answer may be
somewhat surprising, given that every one of the 100,000 taxpayers
engaged in a tax transaction that created an expected tax liability of
$60; the best the income tax system can do might be to collect
something close to $6 million from the group, getting $60 from each of
the 100,000, since they are all equal in the eyes of the law with regard
to these transactions. That is, as among the 100,000, the principle of
horizontal equity would suggest that each should pay $60 in income
taxes for engaging in the transaction in question.85 Because a fault85 The following is a summary of the possible distributive combinations
associated with the strict liability and fault-based approach to tax penalties, using the
example in the text. It assumes that a Bentham-Becker penalty regime is in place, but
that no penalties are assessed under a fault-based regime, since all taxpayer are
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based standard can, for game-theoretic reasons, result in the
imposition of no penalties (again, assuming all taxpayers rationally
decide to comply with the standard), only the strict liability tax
penalty system, which imposes the penalty on the few audited
taxpayers found to owe taxes, would achieve this distributively
desirable result. That is, only the strict liability tax penalty regime
forces taxpayers who make investments in reliance on uncertain
(sometimes very uncertain) tax positions to bear the expected income
tax liabilities associated with those positions.86
Note how this result differs from the result in a nontax area of
law, such as torts, where we do not usually think of the law as being
explicitly distributive in nature. If we imagine tort law being primarily
about deterring accidents, rather than about trying to achieve a
particular distribution of income, we do not care whether the penalties
are ever imposed. So long as, say, drivers are encouraged to drive
carefully or manufacturers are induced to make safe products, there is
no independent reason to require the payment of fines or damages.
The victims of accidents caused by reasonably safe driving or
reasonably safe products can be compensated much more efficiently
through their own first-party insurance companies than through

induced to meet the threshold standard of reasonableness. (1) The fault-based
approach (with no insurance): the 600 taxpayers who are audited and lose pay $100
each; everyone else - the 400 who are audited and win and the 999,000 who are not
audited - pays nothing, for a total of $60,000 in taxes collected from this group (the
other $5,940,000 would come from other taxpayers). (2) The strict liability approach
(without insurance): the 600 taxpayers who are audited and lose pay $10,000 each; the
400 who are audited and win, and the 999,000 who are not audited pay nothing, for a
total of $6 million. (3) The strict liability approach (with insurance) : each of the
100,000 who engages in the transaction pays $60, for a total of $6 million, which gets
paid by insurer when 600 taxpayer/insureds are required to pay $10,000 each. (4)
Changing the example to allow for a detection probability of one, 100,000 taxpayers
get audited and 60,000 are required to pay $100 in back-taxes each (no penalty in that
case is necessary), for a total of $6 million.
86 Whether one believes that the strict tax liability approach, plus the Bentham
Becker penalty, must be accompanied by tax liability insurance to achieve distributive
justice superiority over the fault-based approach will depend largely on whether one
is an ex ante or ex post egalitarian. That is, if you think that fairness requires only that
each of the 100,000 taxpayers in my example be treated equally only with respect to
their ex ante choice, and not the ex post outcomes, then the insurance is not
necessary. Each of the 100,000 had the chance to decline to engage in the risky tax
position, and if they eventually experience the large Bentham-Becker penalty, that is
a function of pure option luck. Again, that result assumes perfectly informed
voluntary decision-making on the part of the taxpayers, which may approximate the
real world in cases involving sophisticated taxpayers.
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penalties assessed by the government. But conventional wisdom
suggests that tax law is different.87 Tax law, at least the income tax, is
primarily about (1) raising revenue to spend on public goods and (2)
allocating the tax burdens in a manner consistent with our society's
vision of distributive fairness, whatever that vision happens to be.
Hence, when Congress decides that the tax system should collect a
certain amount of money from taxpayers who meet a particular
description, and thus satisfy certain criteria set out in the law, then
failing to collect the tax from those individuals means Congress has to
raise the money some other way, such as increasing the national debt
or raising rates for everyone. The problem is that either of these latter
options produces a distributive result that is different from what
Congress intended and from the social optimum. These divergences
from the optimal distributive outcome represent losses of social
welfare to the same extent as do distortions of labor choices caused by
various tax rules.88
In sum, the main problems with a probabilistic fault-based tax
penalty regime are that such a regime (1) is relatively difficult to
administer, (2) owing to the activity-level effect, may result in far too
many uncertain (albeit "reasonably uncertain") tax positions being
taken, and (3) fails to allocate the tax liabilities associated with those
legally uncertain transactions to the group of taxpayers who engaged
in them. In its idealized form, the strict liability tax penalty regime
with the Bentham-Becker penalty, accompanied by a tax transaction
insurance regime, which could somehow deal with the adverse
selection and moral hazard problems, is able to avoid or at least
minimize these problems. That result, however, depends on several
key assumptions. It should come as no surprise therefore that the best
case for using a fault-based tax penalty builds on the inapplicability of
these assumptions in the real world.
C.

The Best Case for a Fault-Based Tax Penalty Regime

As mentioned above, and as every tax practitioner knows, the tax
penalty regime currently in effect for the U.S. income tax is a
combination of (1) strict liability with respect to back-taxes and
f57 For an argument that other areas of law besides tax might also be understood
as having a distributive component, see Kyle Logue & Ronen Avraham,
Redistributing Optimally: Of Tax Rules, Legal Rules, and Insurance, 56 TAX L. REV.
203 (2003).
88 See Louis Kaplow, How Tax Complexity and Enforcement Affect the Equity
and Efficiency of the Income Tax, 49 NAT'L. TAX J. 135 (1996).
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interest and (2) a fault-based system of sorts for penalties. What sort
of fault-based penalty is it? In fact, as mentioned above, there are
several tax penalties, all of which require some showing of fault on the
part of the taxpayer. There are penalties for tax fraud, intended for
situations in which the taxpayer knowingly and intentionally violates a
clear tax law.89 Again, tax fraud penalties do not involve situations of
substantive legal uncertainty. Next, there is the negligence penalty,
imposed on the taxpayer who fails to do what a reasonable taxpayer
would do under the circumstances.90 It is unclear what qualifies as
reasonable in this setting, but the Service has said that a reasonable
mistake is the sort of mistake that an average taxpayer might make,
assuming she has made reasonable efforts to inform herself of the law
(whatever that means). Interestingly, the Service has further defined
reasonable care to include any tax position that has at least a
"reasonable basis" in the law.9 1 Recall that the reasonable basis
standard, which is more stringent than nonfrivolous and less stringent
than substantial authority, is sometimes quantified as approximating
20% likelihood of winning on the merits. Finally, the substantial
understatement penalty applies instead of the negligence penalty to
large tax understatements and has a more stringent fault-based
standard. Under this penalty, the taxpayer must have more than a
reasonable basis - she must have substantial authority for the
questionable position.92 Here the safe harbor or target level of
threshold probability is closer to 40% .93 And under current law, this
target threshold probability of legal certainty rises to about 50% for
certain categories of tax positions, such as so-called "reportable
transactions" that are considered somewhat more questionable
because of their nature.94
What all of the current fault-based tax penalties have in common,
then, are their reliance on some targeted threshold merits probability.
How might such a penalty regime be j ustified, given the analysis
above that seems to favor a strict liability penalty regime? First it must
be recognized that a full-fledged Bentham-Becker penalty regime
across the board to all taxpayers is unrealistic. The ex post unfairness
and judgment-proof problems of imposing large punitive penalties on
the few taxpayers whose tax positions are rejected on audit and the
89
90
91
92
93
94

I.RC. § 6663.
Treas. Reg.§ l .6662-3(b)(l ) (as amended in 2003).
Id.
I.RC. § 6662(d)(2)(B).
Treas. Reg.§ l .6662-4(d)(2) (as amended in 2003).
I.RC.§ 6664(d)(2).
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imperfections in the tax transaction insurance response make it
unfeasible. Although it is an interesting theoretical possibility,
Congress will never in fact adopt a tax penalty regime that would
impose a $9900 penalty for a tax underpayment of $100. Given this
fact, we are probably limited to tax penalties that are far lower than
the Bentham-Becker ideal, though it is difficult to deny that the
normal penalty should be greater than the current 20% of the tax
underpayments.
If for practical or political reasons we are unlikely ever to have tax
penalties that approximate the Bentham-Becker ideal, a reasonably
strong argument can be made for using a fault-based approach, of the
sort that creates target thresholds of legal certainty. The gist of the
idea is simple: if we cannot adopt a regime that would in effect induce
taxpayers themselves to identify the optimal merits probability
threshold for a given transaction and to make optimal decisions at the
margins regarding whether to rely on a particular uncertain tax
interpretation or not, which again is what the idealized strict liability
regime would do, we should instead choose some arbitrary merits
probability threshold - some minimally acceptable target level of
legal certainty - and then, through the use of penalties, try to induce
everyone at least to meet that standard. Such an all-or-nothing penalty
would have the effect of creating relatively strong incentives for
taxpayer compliance, at least to the extent of the target threshold
level of certainty. Taxpayers, by satisfying the targeted threshold level
of legal certainty, can avoid all penalties, whereas if they fail to satisfy
it and get caught, they owe the full penalty. This all-or-nothing effect
would be especially strong for taxpayers who are risk-averse with
respect to large tax penalties and when there is some uncertainty as to
the actual application of the standard by the Service and the courts.95
Does this mean that current law has chosen the optimal target
thresholds of legal certainty to serve as triggers for the various
penalties? That is, are reasonable basis, realistic possibility of success,
substantial authority, and more likely than not the right thresholds?
95 In addition, we might choose a fault-based tax penalty standard because we
believe that failure to meet the minimal threshold of legal certainty imposed by the
tax law is a signal that the taxpayer is probably cheating on her taxes in other ways
that we cannot see. That is, we may decide that, because we cannot detect all
instances of bad conduct and we cannot impose a Bentham-Becker penalty to make
up for this failure of detection (even if we wanted to), then, when we do discover
behavior that falls below some threshold level of acceptability, we will make that an
occasion for punishment. I thank my colleague Omri Ben-Shahar for suggesting this
possibility to me.
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Does the law assign the right legal certainty target for the right types
of transactions? These are impossible questions to answer. My own
instinct would be that, in addition to increasing the magnitude of
penalties, it would be useful to increase the threshold target level of
certainty for all fault-based penalties to more likely than not. The
alternative would be to keep the general shape of the current penalty
regime, which imposes a higher certainty threshold for (1) uncertain
tax positions that are not disclosed to the Service (and hence that have
a lower probability of detection) and (2) tax positions that are similar
in structure to positions that are known to be especially aggressive,
but perhaps to raise the level of certainty required for any type of tax
position to avoid penalties.
VIII. CONCLUSION
No matter how hard Congress and the Treasury Department try
to specify the precise tax treatment of every conceivable situation, this
can't be done. There will always be gaps in the tax laws. Given this
fact, what tax penalty regime will induce taxpayers to make the right
choice regarding whether, and under what conditions, to rely on a
particular uncertain interpretation of the law? This question is made
much more interesting, and problematic, due to a second type of legal
uncertainty: detection uncertainty, or the uncertainty as to whether a
particular tax position will even be questioned by the enforcement
authorities. The combination of these two types of legal uncertainty
creates a serious tax enforcement problem.
Applying the traditional framework of deterrence theory, which I
borrow from the tax policy and law-and-economics literatures, this
article reaches a number of novel conclusions regarding the optimal
level of tax compliance and the optimal tax compliance penalties
when the substantive tax law is uncertain.
First, the optimal level of legal certitude that a taxpayer should
have before claiming a substantively uncertain tax benefit will, under
a number of assumptions to be specified below, depend on (1) the
amount of tax benefit at stake in the particular investment, (2) the size
of the potential pre-tax profit from the investment, and (3) the
taxpayer's attitude towards risk.
Second, if we assume there is no "detection uncertainty" (that is,
if we assume that any legal violation will be detected with certainty), a
simple rule of strict liability for back-taxes plus interest with no
additional, punitive penalty produces optimal ex ante tax compliance
incentives.
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Third, if we assume (1) that there is some detection uncertainty
(that is, a positive, but less than one, probability of detection), (2) that
there is no upper limit on the amount of the potential ex post penalty
that can be imposed on taxpayers who underpay, and (3) that the ex
post law enforcer, either the Service or court, can accurately
determine the ex ante probability of detection for the particular
activity in question, then a strict liability rule with a punitive "kicker"
achieves optimal ex ante tax compliance incentives when there is
substantive legal uncertainty.
Fourth, if we assume that taxpayers are risk-averse, some form of
tax insurance could be used to convert the risk of a large ex post tax
liability to a certain payment of the taxpayer's expected tax liability.
Given these conclusions, another interesting question arises:
Under what circumstances might a fault-based tax penalty regime be a
superior, or least a plausible, alternative to a strict liability regime?
What exactly should the fault-standard look like? How would it be
applied by the ex post adjudicator, whether that role is filled by the
Service or a court? What makes these questions especially interesting
is that the current tax penalty system in the United States for federal
income taxes is a fault-based regime rather than a strict liability
regime. That is, although the Code obviously applies a strict liability
standard for the underpaid taxes and interest (i.e., taxpayers owe
whatever the courts determine the Code says they owe), tax penalties
under the Code are determined on the basis of a fault-based standard.
Under current rules, taxpayers can avoid penalties if they can show
that they have met what amounts to a reasonableness standard. With
respect to the fault-based approach to income tax penalties, this
article reaches two more conclusions:
One, if we maintain all of the traditional assumptions of classical
economic analysis and we assume that there is no upper limit on the
size of potential ex post fines for tax avoidance, a fault-based tax
penalty is inferior to a strict liability approach for three reasons: (1)
the fault-based regime is more difficult to administer; (2) it
encourages taxpayers to over-invest, or invest too often, in legally
uncertain tax positions; and (3) the fault-based regime fails to achieve
the same degree of rough distributive justice that the strict liability
approach does (with tax insurance).
Finally, if we relax some of the traditional economic assumptions
such as perfect rationality and the absence of informal social
sanctions, and if we assume that there are upper limits on the amount
of tax penalties that society can reasonably impose, a case can be
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made for using a fault-based tax penalty regime not entirely different
from the one that is currently in force.
All of these conclusions are based on some pretty strong
assumptions. Some of the assumptions, although obviously unrealistic
(such as the perfectly rational taxpayer assumption and the infallible
Service and court assumption), do not tend to favor one penalty
regime over another. Others, however, may actually affect the
comparison. For example, if it simply is not possible, for political or
other reasons, to impose large punitive penalties that approximate
those suggested by the Bentham-Becker model, then it is not clear
that a strict liability regime is superior to a fault-based regime. In that
case, a fault approach, with an arbitrarily chosen - and somewhat
high - targeted merits probability threshold might induce a higher
level of tax compliance than would a strict liability rule, especially if
taxpayers are risk-averse (and not allowed to insure) and hence would
have a tendency to over-comply with the uncertain standard.96 Also, if
we allow for the possibility of informal sanctions, such as social norms
against tax noncompliance, which we have been assuming away, it
might be that lower formal penalties would lead to higher informal
penalties; and the combination might provide greater overall
deterrence than the imposition of a true Bentham-Becker penalty
regime.97 The possible interaction between formal and informal tax
sanctions, between tax law and tax norms, raises very important
questions, but I have left those questions for another day.
Besides the fact that 20% and 30% underpayment penalties are
probably too low to get the ex ante compliance incentives right, this
article takes no ultimate position on which tax penalty regime is best.
Rather, the goal of this article has been to set forth a framework for
analyzing this question. My own tentative view is that a fault-based
tax penalty standard might work best with most individual taxpayers
but that with corporate taxpayers (and perhaps some wealthy
individual taxpayers) a strict liability approach with something
approaching Bentham-Becker penalties
and private or
government-provided tax transaction insurance - might be worth
96 See John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on
Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965 (1984).
97 This might be true, for example, if it turned out that formal tax penalties, such
as those provided in the Code and enforced by the Service, had the effect of
"crowding out" more informal sanctions for tax noncompliance. Of course, formal
and informal penalties do not necessarily have to interact as substitutes but could also
be complements, in which case cutting formal penalties may send the wrong message
and actually encourage noncompliance.
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trying. The other interesting question raised by this article's analysis is
whether the same questions are raised - such as the question of the
optimal merits probability threshold - and the same framework
could be applied to any area of law in which the substantive legal
standards and rules are uncertain.

